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8:45AM THE PRESIDENT departs the White House en route Andrews Air Force Base
9:00AM THE PRESIDENT departs Andrews Air Force Base en route Memphis, Tennessee
10:00AM THE PRESIDENT arrives in Memphis, Tennessee
Memphis International Airport
10:30AM THE PRESIDENT meets with families impacted by the flooding, state and local officials, first responders and volunteers
Cook Convention Center
12:00PM THE PRESIDENT delivers the commencement address at Booker T. Washington High School, the winner of the 2011 Race to the Top Commencement Challenge
Cook Convention Center
2:25PM THE PRESIDENT departs Memphis, Tennessee en route Andrews Air Force Base
Memphis International Airport
5:15PM THE PRESIDENT arrives at Andrews Air Force Base
5:30PM THE PRESIDENT arrives at the White House
5:35PM THE PRESIDENT welcomes the University of Connecticut mens basketball team to the White House for a ceremony honoring their 2011 NCAA national championship
6:55PM THE PRESIDENT delivers remarks at a DNC event
St. Regis Hotel
9:25PM THE PRESIDENT delivers remarks at a DNC event
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
The Federal Reserve and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) are issuing the attached Supervisory Guidance on Model Risk Management, which is intended for use by banking organizations and supervisors as they assess organizations’ management of model risk. This guidance should be applied as appropriate to all banking organizations supervised by the Federal Reserve, taking into account each organization’s size, nature, and complexity, as well as the extent and sophistication of its use of models (as defined and discussed below).
Banking organizations should be attentive to the possible adverse consequences (including financial loss) of decisions based on models that are incorrect or misused, and should address those consequences through active model risk management. The attachment to this SR letter describes in more detail the key aspects of an effective model risk management framework, including robust model development, implementation, and use effective validation and sound governance, policies, and controls.
Previous publications issued by the Federal Reserve and OCC have addressed the use of models, with particular focus on model validation. 1 Based on supervisory and industry experience over the past several years, this document expands upon existing guidance—most importantly by broadening the scope to include other key aspects of model risk management.
For the purposes of this document, the term model refers to a quantitative method, system, or approach that applies statistical, economic, financial, or mathematical theories, techniques, and assumptions to process input data into quantitative estimates. Models meeting this definition might be used for analyzing business strategies, informing business decisions, identifying and measuring risks, valuing exposures, instruments or positions, conducting stress testing, assessing adequacy of capital, managing client assets, measuring compliance with internal limits, maintaining the formal control apparatus of the bank, or meeting financial or regulatory reporting requirements and issuing public disclosures. The definition of model also covers quantitative approaches whose inputs are partially or wholly qualitative or based on expert judgment, provided that the output is quantitative in nature. 2
The use of models invariably presents model risk, which is the potential for adverse consequences from decisions based on incorrect or misused model outputs and reports. Model risk can lead to financial loss, poor business and strategic decision-making, or damage to a banking organization’s reputation. Model risk occurs primarily for two reasons: (1) a model may have fundamental errors and produce inaccurate outputs when viewed against its design objective and intended business uses (2) a model may be used incorrectly or inappropriately or there may be a misunderstanding about its limitations and assumptions. Model risk increases with greater model complexity, higher uncertainty about inputs and assumptions, broader extent of use, and larger potential impact. Banking organizations should manage model risk both from individual models and in the aggregate.
A guiding principle throughout the guidance is that managing model risk involves "effective challenge" of models: critical analysis by objective, informed parties that can identify model limitations and produce appropriate changes. Effective challenge depends on a combination of incentives, competence, and influence.
As is generally the case with other risks, materiality is an important consideration in model risk management. If at some banks the use of models is less pervasive and has less impact on their financial condition, then those banks may not need as complex an approach to model risk management in order to meet supervisory expectations. However, where models and model output have a material impact on business decisions, including decisions related to risk management and capital and liquidity planning, and where model failure would have a particularly harmful impact on a bank’s financial condition, a bank’s model risk management framework should be more extensive and rigorous.
Model development relies heavily on the experience and judgment of developers, and model risk management should include disciplined model development and implementation processes that are consistent with the situation and goals of the model user and with the banking organization’s policy. A sound development process includes: a clear statement of purpose to ensure that the model is developed in line with its intended use sound design, theory, and logic underlying the model robust model methodologies and processing components rigorous assessment of data quality and relevance and appropriate documentation. An integral part of model development is testing, in which the various components of a model and its overall functioning are evaluated to show the model is performing as intended to demonstrate that it is accurate, robust, and stable and to evaluate its limitations and assumptions. Importantly, organizations should ensure that the development of the more judgmental and qualitative aspects of their models is also sound.
All models have some degree of uncertainty and inaccuracy because they are by definition imperfect representations of reality. An important outcome of effective model development, implementation, and use is a banking organization’s demonstrated understanding of and accounting for such uncertainty. Accounting for model uncertainty can include applying well-supported, judgmental, “conservative” adjustments to model output, placing less emphasis on a model’s output, or ensuring that a model is only used when supplemented by other models or approaches. 3
Model validation is the set of processes and activities intended to verify that models are performing as expected, in line with their design objectives and business uses. Effective validation helps to ensure that models are sound, identifying potential limitations and assumptions and assessing their possible impact. All model components—inputs, processing, outputs, and reports—should be subject to validation this applies equally to models developed in-house and to those purchased from or developed by vendors or consultants.
Validation involves a degree of independence from model development and use. Generally, validation is done by staff who are not responsible for model development or use and do not have a stake in whether a model is determined to be valid. As a practical matter, some validation work may be most effectively done by model developers and users it is essential, however, that such validation work be subject to critical review by an independent party, who should conduct additional activities to ensure proper validation. Overall, the quality of the validation process is indicated by critical review by objective, knowledgeable parties and the actions taken to address issues identified by those parties.
Validation activities should continue on an ongoing basis after a model goes into use to track known model limitations and to identify any new ones. Validation is an important check during periods of benign economic and financial conditions, when estimates of risk and potential loss can become overly optimistic and the data at hand may not fully reflect more stressed conditions. Banking organizations should conduct a periodic review—at least annually but more frequently if warranted—of each model to determine whether it is working as intended and if the existing validation activities are sufficient. Key elements of comprehensive validation include:
- Evaluation of Conceptual Soundness. This element involves assessing the quality of the model design and construction, as well as review of documentation and empirical evidence supporting the methods used and variables selected for the model. This step in validation should ensure that judgment exercised in model design and construction is well informed, carefully considered, and consistent with published research and with sound industry practice.
- Ongoing Monitoring. This step in validation is done to confirm that the model is appropriately implemented and is being used and performing as intended. It is essential to evaluate whether changes in products, exposures, activities, clients, or market conditions necessitate adjustment, redevelopment, or replacement of the model and to verify that any extension of the model beyond its original scope is valid. Benchmarking can be used in this step to compare a given model’s inputs and outputs to estimates from alternatives.
- Outcomes Analysis. This step involves comparing model outputs to corresponding actual outcomes. Back-testing is one form of outcomes analysis that involves the comparison of actual outcomes with model forecasts during a sample time period not used in model development at a frequency that matches the model’s forecast horizon or performance window.
The results of the three core elements of the validation process may reveal significant errors or inaccuracies in model development or outcomes that consistently fall outside the banking organization’s predetermined thresholds of acceptability. In such cases, model adjustment, recalibration, or redevelopment is warranted. At times, banking organizations may have a limited ability to use key model validation tools for various reasons, such as lack of data or of price observability. In those cases, even more attention should be paid to the model’s limitations when considering the appropriateness of model usage, and senior management should be fully informed of those limitations when using the models for decision-making. Generally, senior management should ensure that appropriate mitigating steps are taken in light of identified model limitations, which can include adjustments to model output, restrictions on model use, reliance on other models or approaches, or other compensating controls
Developing and maintaining strong governance over the model risk management framework is fundamentally important to its effectiveness. Strong governance provides explicit support and structure to risk management functions through policies defining relevant risk management activities, procedures that implement those policies, allocation of resources, and mechanisms for testing that policies and procedures are being carried out as specified. Strong governance also includes documentation of model development and validation that is sufficiently detailed to allow parties unfamiliar with a model to understand how the model operates, as well as its limitations and key assumptions.
Model risk governance is provided at the highest level by the board of directors and senior management when they establish an organization-wide approach to model risk management. Board members should ensure that the level of model risk is within their tolerance. A banking organization’s internal audit function should assess the overall effectiveness of the model risk management framework, including the framework’s ability to address both types of model risk for individual models and in the aggregate. Whenever a banking organization uses external resources for model risk management, the organization should specify the activities to be conducted in a clearly written and agreed-upon scope of work, and those activities should be conducted in accordance with this guidance. Also, organizations should maintain an inventory of models implemented for use, under development for implementation, or recently retired.
All banking organizations should ensure that their internal policies and procedures are consistent with the risk management principles and supervisory expectations contained in this guidance.
For questions regarding this guidance, please contact David Palmer, Senior Supervisory Financial Analyst, Risk, at (202) 452-2904 Dwight Smith, Senior Supervisory Financial Analyst, Capital & Regulatory Policy, at (202) 452-2773 or Anna Lee Hewko, Assistant Director, at (202) 530-6260. In addition, questions may be sent via the Board’s public website. 4
Patrick M. Parkinson
Division of Banking
Supervision and Regulation
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Comparison of therapeutic effects of garlic and d-Penicillamine in patients with chronic occupational lead poisoning
Previous studies on animals have revealed that garlic (Allium sativum) is effective in reducing blood and tissue lead concentrations. The aim of this study was to investigate therapeutic effects of garlic and compare it with d-penicillamine in patients with chronic lead poisoning. After coordination and obtaining informed consent, clinical examinations and blood lead concentration (BLC) of 117 workers at a car battery industry were investigated. BLC was determined by heated graphite atomization technique of an atomic absorption spectrometer. The workers were randomly assigned into two groups of garlic (1200 μg allicin, three times daily) and d-penicillamine (250 mg, three times daily) and treated for 4 weeks. BLC was determined again 10days post-treatment. Clinical signs and symptoms of lead poisoning were also investigated and compared with the initial findings. Clinical improvement was significant in a number of clinical manifestations including irritability (p = 0.031), headache (p = 0.028), decreased deep tendon reflex (p=0.019) and mean systolic blood pressure (0.021) after treatment with garlic, but not d-penicillamine. BLCs were reduced significantly (p=0.002 and p=0.025) from 426.32±185.128 to 347.34±121.056 μg/L and from 417.47±192.54 to 315.76±140.00μg/L in the garlic and d-penicillamine groups, respectively, with no significant difference (p=0.892) between the two groups. The frequency of side effects was significantly (p=0.023) higher in d-penicillamine than in the garlic group. Thus, garlic seems safer clinically and as effective as d-penicillamine. Therefore, garlic can be recommended for the treatment of mild-to-moderate lead poisoning.
© 2011 The Authors. Basic & Clinical Pharmacology & Toxicology © 2011 Nordic Pharmacological Society.
Where Else to Find Historical Quotes
There are several other resources online to find historical price quotes. Online brokerage sites such as eTrade and TD Ameritrade or apps like Robinhood will have both real-time and historical quote data for customers and usually limited access for non-customers as well. Financial websites like Motley Fool or Google Finance will also provide quote information for both stocks and indices.
For a history of index price returns dating back to the year 1928, you can check out this table maintained by New York University's Stern Business School.
Revolving Regulators: SEC Faces Ethics Challenges with Revolving Door
The financial meltdown of 2008 brought renewed focus to the integrity and aggressiveness of federal government oversight of the financial system. One of the most important agencies overseeing financial markets and investor protection is the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission).
Several critics, including Members of Congress, have said the SEC’s integrity has been undermined by the “revolving door”—where former SEC employees go to work for entities overseen by the Commission. The revolving door also operates in the opposite direction, where individuals come from entities regulated by the SEC to work for the Commission. The general concern is that a conflict of interest could bias SEC oversight and undermine public confidence in the SEC’s work, as acknowledged by the current SEC Chairman.
The SEC requires that its former employees file post-government employment statements if they plan to represent a client before the Commission within two years of leaving the SEC. The Project On Government Oversight (POGO) filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for all post-employment statements filed by former SEC employees between 2006 and 2010 and analyzed these statements and other documents. POGO found that:
- Between 2006 and 2010, 219 former SEC employees filed 789 post-employment statements indicating their intent to represent an outside client before the Commission
- Some former SEC employees filed statements within days of leaving the Commission, with one employee filing within 2 days of leaving
- Some former SEC employees filed numerous statements during this time period, with one former employee filing 20 statements
- There are 131 entities providing legal, accounting, consulting, and other services that were identified as new employers in the statements. Some entities recruited numerous SEC employees during the five-year period.
- In the vast majority of statements, former SEC employees affirm that they did not participate personally or substantially in, or have official responsibility for, the matter on which they now expect to appear before the Commission
- POGO identified instances in which former SEC employees may have been required to file statements during the five-year period but did not
- The SEC Office of Inspector General has identified cases in which the revolving door appeared to be a factor in staving off SEC enforcement actions and other types of SEC oversight, including cases involving Bear Stearns and the Stanford Ponzi scheme
- One recent empirical study uncovered several significant and systematic biases in the SEC’s enforcement patterns and found indirect evidence to support the contention that “post-agency employment at higher salaries may operate as a quid pro quo in return for favorable regulatory treatment”
- Some former SEC employees disclosed that they consulted with ethics officers regarding the work they intended to do on behalf of their clients before the SEC, but in many other statements, it is unclear whether the former employees discussed their post-employment plans with an ethics officer
- Some statements indicate that the former employee did participate in or have responsibility for a related matter while they worked at the SEC, but that they discussed the matter with an ethics officer who advised them they could contact Commission staff on that issue on behalf of their new client
- There were some inconsistencies in the SEC’s handling of FOIA exemptions in the statements requested by POGO—for instance, while the vast majority of statements disclosed the names of the former employees, in several cases this information was withheld
POGO recommends that Congress and the SEC:
- Strengthen and simplify post-employment restrictions
- Make post-employment statements publicly available online
- Verify completeness and accuracy of post-employment statements
- Strengthen restrictions for new employees coming from industry
- Publicly disclose SEC recusal database and ethics waivers
- Strengthen and utilize ethics enforcement authority
- Extend post-employment regulations to other financial regulatory agencies
- Review confidential treatment procedures and FOIA exemptions
Warning over 118 directory enquiries call charges
Calling directory enquiries from a mobile can cost more than £2, while a typical 45-second 118 call costs an average of £1.75 from a landline, research shows.
Analysis of the amounts charged by the two biggest directory services show that a 45-second landline call to 118 118 costs £1.61, while an identical call to BT's 118 500 costs £1.88. The cheapest mobile rate for the same length call is £1.53 from O2, while T-Mobile charges £2.04.
However, if you make the expensive mistake of asking to be put through to your requested number the costs can spiral astronomically and vary dramatically, according to the research by free directory enquiries provider 192.com.
A directory enquiry call to 118 118 plus five minutes of chatting after being connected will cost £3.71 from a landline the same call to 118 500 would cost £8.83. Orange is the cheapest of the mobile providers, charging £4.74, followed by O2 at £8.80, Vodafone at £12 and T-Mobile with an eye-watering £12.24.
The call charges are also much higher for international directory enquiries: calls from a BT landline to 118 500 costs £2.99 a minute (or part of a minute) plus a connection charge of 99p.
However, the research indicates that consumers grossly underestimate the cost of making directory calls, with 66% believing they cost less than £1.
Ofcom closed a consultation into the simplification of non-geographic numbers, including those starting with 118, in March. This suggested simpler pricing and standardising phone company and service provider charges. Ofcom noted that customer confidence in non-geographic numbers had declined as mobile use increased, resulting in bill shock as people received much bigger bills than expected.
In a classic example of understatement, it cited the example of one man who was charged £350 for a 118 call and connection from a landline in 2009: "Consumer has said that he is upset with the lack of information given by directory enquiries as they didn't advise him of what the connection costs would be and the charge to call them."
In 2009 directory calls cost consumers an estimated £500m, with low income households particularly exposed because many don't have landlines. According to Ofcom, 26% of lower socio-economic groups rely on mobiles for making high cost, non-geographic calls compared to 9% of ABC1 households.
The spiralling costs of directory enquiries began in 2003 when Oftel (now Ofcom) opened up the directory enquiries market to new firms, ironically with the aim of increasing competition and reducing costs to consumers.
The effects of intermittent or continuous energy restriction on weight loss and metabolic disease risk markers: a randomized trial in young overweight women
Background: The problems of adherence to energy restriction in humans are well known.
Objective: To compare the feasibility and effectiveness of intermittent continuous energy (IER) with continuous energy restriction (CER) for weight loss, insulin sensitivity and other metabolic disease risk markers.
Design: Randomized comparison of a 25% energy restriction as IER (∼ 2710 kJ/day for 2 days/week) or CER (∼ 6276 kJ/day for 7 days/week) in 107 overweight or obese (mean (± s.d.) body mass index 30.6 (± 5.1) kg m(-2)) premenopausal women observed over a period of 6 months. Weight, anthropometry, biomarkers for breast cancer, diabetes, cardiovascular disease and dementia risk insulin resistance (HOMA), oxidative stress markers, leptin, adiponectin, insulin-like growth factor (IGF)-1 and IGF binding proteins 1 and 2, androgens, prolactin, inflammatory markers (high sensitivity C-reactive protein and sialic acid), lipids, blood pressure and brain-derived neurotrophic factor were assessed at baseline and after 1, 3 and 6 months.
Results: Last observation carried forward analysis showed that IER and CER are equally effective for weight loss: mean (95% confidence interval ) weight change for IER was -6.4 (-7.9 to -4.8) kg vs -5.6 (-6.9 to -4.4) kg for CER (P-value for difference between groups = 0.4). Both groups experienced comparable reductions in leptin, free androgen index, high-sensitivity C-reactive protein, total and LDL cholesterol, triglycerides, blood pressure and increases in sex hormone binding globulin, IGF binding proteins 1 and 2. Reductions in fasting insulin and insulin resistance were modest in both groups, but greater with IER than with CER difference between groups for fasting insulin was -1.2 (-1.4 to -1.0) μU ml(-1) and for insulin resistance was -1.2 (-1.5 to -1.0) μU mmol(-1) l(-1) (both P = 0.04).
Conclusion: IER is as effective as CER with regard to weight loss, insulin sensitivity and other health biomarkers, and may be offered as an alternative equivalent to CER for weight loss and reducing disease risk.
Background Experiments in Humans
In the early 1980's several products containing crude preparations of bean amylase inhibitors were marketed in the United States. However early clinical studies were disappointing and it was discovered that the preparations had insufficient enzyme inhibiting activity, as well as issues with potency and stability. Subsequently, a research group at the Mayo Clinic developed a partially purified white bean product and published a series of studies exploring the activity of inhibitor in human clinical studies. The test product was described as a concentrate: 6 to 8-fold by total protein content and 30 to 40 fold by dry weight . The product was found to inactivate salivary, intraduodenal and intraileal amylase activity in vitro. Its activity was not affected by exposure to gastric juice and only minimally by duodenal juice (by 15%). In vitro studies demonstrated that the inhibitor decreased digestion of dietary starch in a dose-dependent manner . Perfusion of the white bean product into the duodenum of human subjects completely inhibited the activity of intraluminal amylase activity (5.0 mg/ml at 5 ml/min) . Subsequent experiments were conducted with volunteers intubated with an oroileal tube in order to obtain duodenal, jejuna and terminal ileal samples . After intubation the subjects ingested 50 g rice starch and on the subsequent day they ingested starch with the amylase inhibitor (5 g or 10 g white bean extract). The white bean extract significantly reduced duodenal, jejunal, and ileal intraluminal amylase activity by more than 95% it acted as quickly as 15 minutes, and for as long as 2 hours. It increased the post prandial delivery of carbohydrates to the distal small bowel by 22 to 24% (as measured by oroileal tube aspiration) and increased hydrogen concentrations in the breath from 30 to 90 minutes after the meal. Hydrogen breath testing is an accepted method of determining carbohydrate malabsorption as colonic bacteria ferment carbohydrates into organic acids, carbon dioxide and hydrogen. A percentage of these gases are absorbed into the portal blood stream and subsequently expired through the lungs [23-25]. The white bean extract also reduced the postprandial plasma glucose rose by 85% and eliminated the subsequent fall of glucose level to below fasting levels. The extract significantly lowered the postprandial plasma levels of insulin, C-peptide and gastric inhibitory polypeptide .
A follow-up study using subjects with diabetes mellitus demonstrated a decrease in the postprandial increases in plasma glucose and insulin levels . Further studies revealed that a dose of 3.8 g white bean inhibitor could cause more than twice the amount of hydrogen in the breath following a standard spaghetti meal. The percentage of malabsorbed carbohydrate increased from 4.7% to 7.0% (p < 0.05). Also, the form of the inhibitor (powder, tablet) had no effect on the activity when taken with the spaghetti . Follow-up studies found that a dose of 2.9 g was sufficient to significantly inhibit the postprandial increases in blood glucose, C-peptide and gastric inhibitory polypeptide following 650-calorie meal containing carbohydrate, fat and protein . A longer-term study was conducted over 3 weeks with 6 non-insulin dependent diabetics. The subjects were given sufficient white bean inhibitor to reduce the increase in postprandial plasma glucose by more than 30%: a dose of 4 to 6 g with each meal. As a result there were significant decreases in postprandial glucose, C-peptide, insulin and gastric inhibitory polypeptide along with a significant increase in hydrogen excretion in the breath. Diarrhea and gastrointestinal symptoms occurred the first day of administration of the inhibitor and resolved over the next couple of days . A further experiment with 18 healthy subjects reported that carbohydrates perfused into the ileum delayed emptying of a meal infused into the stomach. In one half of the subjects, the amylase inhibitor was added to the ileum perfusate. The inhibitor significantly reduced the absorption of carbohydrate from the ileum and enhanced the delay in gastric emptying. Plasma concentrations of C-peptide, glucagon, motilin, gastrin and human pancreatic polypeptide were not influenced by changes in gastric emptying or by the ileal perfusates. However the delay in gastric emptying was significantly associated with a decrease in plasma concentrations of gastric inhibitory polypeptide and neurotensin along with an increase in concentrations of peptide YY. This effect was caused by the delay in gastric emptying, rather than the other way around. Human polypeptide levels were not changed and the authors concluded that the hormonal changes were not mediated via the vagus nerve .
Phase 2 specifications
The Phase 2 ® product is a water extract of the white kidney bean (Phaseolus vulgaris) standardized to alpha-amylase (8121539) inhibiting units (Pharmachem Laboratories, Kearny, NJ). Phase 2 is produced from non-GMO whole white kidney beans, which are ground and then extracted for 4 hours. The liquid is filtered and concentrated under vacuum. The extract is filtered again, and then pasteurized before being spray dried. Phase 2 is odorless and tasteless. Each lot of Phase 2 has at least 3000 alpha amylase inhibiting units (AAIU) per g when tested at a pH 6.8 using potato starch as the substrate and pancreatin as the enzyme source. The Phase 2 extraction process was designed to make it more potent and stable than the white bean product tested by the Mayo clinic.
Phase 2 is used as a dietary supplement in various forms, including powders, tablets, capsules and chewables. There are approximately 200 brands of nutritional supplement/weight loss products in the worldwide market that contain Phase 2. A typical dose is 1 to 2 capsules, each containing 500 mg, taken before each of 3 daily meals, for a total of 1500 to 3000 mg per day. A private safety panel approved a maximum daily intake of 10,000 mg (10 g) .
Experiments conducted incorporating Phase 2 into food products have found that it can be incorporated into chewing gum, mashed potatoes, yeast-raised dough (bread, pizza, etc) without losing activity or altering the appearance, texture or taste of the food [32-34].
Clinical studies conducted with Phase 2
Ten clinical studies have demonstrated weight loss over time following administration of Phase 2. Three studies demonstrated significant loss of body weight with Phase 2 compared to a placebo control in people who are overweight or obese. The doses ranged from 445 mg for 4 weeks to 3000 mg for 8 to 12 weeks [35-37]. A placebo controlled study by showed a comparative loss in body weight only when subjects were stratified by dietary carbohydrate intake. Those who consumed the greatest amount of carbohydrate, lost significant body weight in comparison to the placebo group . Six additional studies reported a loss of weight over time [39-44]. Three clinical studies reported a reduction in serum triglycerides over time [40,41,44] (Table (Table1 1 ).
|Reference (Author, date)||Study Design/Duration||Subjects||Purpose||Preparation/Dose||Main Results|
|Thom, 2000 ||RPCT, 12 weeks||n = 40 (BMI 28-39)||weight loss||400 mg Phaseolamin ® 3X after meals, total 1200 mg/day (other ingred. inulin &Garcinia extract)||𡤻ody weight, BMI & %body fat in active group (p < 0.05), no effect in placebo group no between group analysis|
|Erner, 2003 ||RPCT, 12 weeks, then open 12 weeks||n = 54 (BMI 24-36)||weight loss||Thera-Slim: 1000 mg Phase2 before 2 meals, total 2000 mg/day||trend toward 𡤻ody weight, 3X decrease in triglycerides no between group analysis|
|Rothacker, 2003 ||RPCT, 12 weeks||n = 88 (BMI 24-32)||weight loss||StarchAway chews: 1000 mg Phase2 before 3 meals, total 3000 mg/day||𡤻ody weight comparison to placebo (p < 0.05)|
|Udani, 2004 ||RPCT, 8 weeks||n = 39 (BMI 30-43)||weight loss||Phase 2 1500 mg 2X, 3000 mg/day||𡤻ody weight comparison to placebo (ns) ↓trigylcerides (ns)|
|Koike, 2005 ||Open, 8 weeks||n = 10 (BMI 23-30)||weight loss||3 capsules Phaseolamin 1600 diet 2X daily 750 mg Phase 2 daily||𡤻ody weight (p = 0.002), calorie intake, BMI, triglycerides & HDL (all p < 0.05)|
|Osorio, 2005 ||Open, 30 days||n = 39 (overweight & obese)||Weight loss||PreCarb capsules: 1000 mg Phase3 with meals, total 3000 mg/day||𡤻ody weight & ↓waist to hip ratio over time (both p < 0.001)|
|Celleno, 2007 ||RPCT, 30 days||n = 60 (BMI avg 26)||Weight loss||Phase 2 + chromium 445 mg extract daily||𡤻ody weight (p < 0.001), BMI, body fat (both p < 0.01)|
|Vinson, 2009 ||PCT, X-over, single dose||Part 1: n = 11, Part 2: n = 7||Plasma glucose||Phase 2 mixed with margarine or gravy. 750 or 1500 mg.||𡤺UC post prandial blood glucose higher dose (p < 0.05).|
|Udani, 2009 ||RPC, X-over, single dose||n = 13 (BMI 18-25)||Plasma glucose||Phase 2 capsules or mixed w/butter. 1500, 2000, 3000 mg||𡤺UC post prandial blood glucose 3000 mg w/butter (p < 0.05).|
|Wu, 2010 ||RPCT, 60 days||n = 101 (BMI 25-40)||Weight loss||Phase 2 1,000 mg 3X daily||𡤻ody weight, waist circumference (both p < 0.01)|
DB = double-blind, PCT = placebo-controlled trial, RPCT = randomized placebo-controlled trial, X-over = crossover
Weight loss - compared to placebo
A 12 week randomized double-blind placebo controlled trial included 60 overweight individuals (BMI between 24 and 32 kg/m 2 ). The subjects consumed 2 soft chews before each meal containing either Phase 2 (500 each mg) or placebo for 12 weeks. The Phase 2 group consumed a total of 3000 mg Phase 2 per day. A total of 88 men and women enrolled in the study, while 60 completed the study and were included in the analyses. There was a statistically significant weight reduction in the active group compared with the placebo group at weeks 6, 8 and 12. The amount of weight lost by the active group at 12 weeks was 6.9 ଗ.9 lbs (average of 0.575 lbs per week) while the placebo group gained 0.8 lbs ଖ.1 (p = 0.029 between groups). There were no significant differences between groups in body fat, lean body mass or body measurements (waist/hip circumferences). No adverse events were reported .
A randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled study was conducted with 60 slightly overweight subjects (5 to 15 kg overweight). The subjects were required to have a stable weight for the past 6 months and underwent a 2-week single-blinded, run-in period prior to randomization. The subjects took 1 tablet (active or placebo) per day for 30 consecutive days before a meal rich in carbohydrates (2000 to 2200 calorie diet). The active tablet contained 445 mg Phase 2 and 0.5 mg chromium picolinate ( mcg elemental chromium). After 30 days, the active group had a significant reduction in body weight, BMI, fat mass, adipose tissue thickness and waist/hip/thigh circumferences while maintaining lean body mass. The active group lost an average of 2.93 kg (6.45 lbs) in 30 days compared with an average of 0.35 kg (0.77 lbs) in the placebo group (p < 0.001). BMI in the test group was reduced from an initial 25.9 ± 2.0 (SEM) to 24.9 ± 1.9 (p < 0.01). The placebo showed no significant change from the initial 26.0 ± 2.3 (SEM). Body composition was measured with bioelectrical impedance. The active group demonstrated a 10.45% reduction in body fat compared with a 0.16% reduction in the placebo group (p < 0.001). Waist and hip circumferences measured in a standard way, showed the same pattern as well. The active group demonstrated 2.93 cm and 1.48 cm reductions respectively, compared with 0.46 cm and 0.11 cm reductions in the placebo group (p < 0.001). No adverse events were reported .
A randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled study was conducted in China with 101 volunteers who had a BMI between 25 and 40. The subjects were given a single capsule containing 1000 mg Phase 2 or placebo three times per day, just before meals, for 60 days. The active group ingested a total of 3,000 mg Phase 2 per day. As a result, there was significant weight loss in the active groups compared to the placebo group after 30 and 60 days. After 60 days, the average weight loss in the active group was 1.9 ± 0.15 kg compared to 0.4 ± 0.13 kg in the placebo group (p < 0.001). There was also a significant reduction in waist measurement in the active group compared to the placebo group (1.9 ± 0.32 cm compared to 0.4 ± 0.26 (p < 0.001). There was no effect on hip measurements. Blood chemistries did not change significantly over the 2 month study and no adverse side effects were reported .
A 4-week, randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled study conducted with 25 healthy overweight (BMI 25-30) subjects . The subjects took 1000 mg of Phase 2 ® or an identical placebo twice a day (before breakfast and lunch) as part of a weight loss program which included diet, exercise and behavioral intervention. The subjects were given nutritional guidelines to standardize their caloric intake at 1800 Kcal/day. Breakfast and lunch were provided to increase compliance. In addition, subjects met with a personal trainer to establish an exercise program and had a counseling session with a behavioral psychologist to identify psychological barriers to weight loss. As a result of this intervention, both groups reduced weight and waist size significantly compared to baseline, but there were no significant differences between groups. After 4 weeks, the active group lost 6.0 lbs and the placebo group lost 4.7 lbs compared to baseline (p = 0.0002 active and p = 0.0016 placebo). The active group lost a mean of 2.2 in inches from their waists and the control group lost 2.1 inches from their waists compared to baseline (p = 0.050 and 0.0001, respectively). For exploratory analysis, subjects were stratified by dietary carbohydrate intake. In this analysis, the tertile that took in the most carbohydrates demonstrated significantly greater loss of body weight compared with the placebo group (8.7 pounds vs. 1.7 pounds, p = 0.04). This group also had a significantly greater loss in inches around the waist (3.3 vs 1.3 inches p = 0.01). There were no significant changes from baseline in hip circumference, triglycerides, fasting glucose, total cholesterol, appetite control, hunger, energy level, and percent body fat, neither were there any significantly differences between groups. No side effects or adverse events were reported .
Weight loss - over time
In a randomized double blind placebo controlled trial, forty healthy overweight (BMI 27.5 to 39.0) were randomized and instructed to take 2 tablets of the test product immediately after all 3 meals (breakfast, lunch and dinner) for 12 weeks . Subjects were also instructed to follow a 1200 kcal/day low-fat diet. The tablets, 650 mg each, contained a proprietary blend (Suco-Bloc ® ) including 200 mg of Phase 2 (Phaseolamin ® , Leuven Bioproducts, Belgium), 200 mg of inulin (from chicory root), and 50 mg of Garcinia cambogia extract. The remaining 200 mg in the tablets were not described. All subjects were included in an intent-to-treat analysis, including 7 subjects who dropped out of the study (6 in the placebo arm, 1 in the active arm). After 12 weeks, the active group had a significant reduction in weight, BMI and percent body fat compared to baseline, whereas there was no significant change in the placebo group. The active group lost an average of 3.5 kg (7.7 lb p = 0.001) and the placebo group lost 1.3 kg (2.9 lb). BMI decreased by 1.3 kg/m 2 (p = 0.01) in the active group and by 0.5 kg/m 2 in the placebo group. Percent body fat (measured by bioelectrical impedance) decreased by 2.3% (p = 0.01) in the active group and by 0.7% in the placebo. Body mass analyses showed that the weight loss in the active group consisted mainly of fat loss as 㺅% of the weight loss was accounted for by fat. Between group analyses was not provided for any of the variables. No adverse events were reported in either group .
A 12 week double-blind, placebo-controlled study was conducted and this period was followed by an additional 12 weeks were in all the participants received the active treatment . In the first part of the study, the subjects took 2 capsules twice a day of placebo or Thera-Slim™. Thera-Slim™ capsules contained 500 mg Phase 2 plus 250 mg fennel seed powder. The placebo contained cellulose and fennel seed powder. The active group received a total of 2000 mg Phase 2 per day. The subjects were asked to eat a diet in which lunch and dinner contained 100 to 200 g of carbohydrates. Sixty overweight and obese adult subjects (BMI 24-36) were randomized and 54 completed the study. After the first 12 weeks, the active group lost a average of 1.4 lbs and the placebo gained an average of 0.6 lbs. Serum triglyceride levels dropped by almost 3.3 times in the active group compared to the placebo group (-38.1 vs -11.9). The levels of total cholesterol and HDL were similar in both groups. No between group analyses were included in the report. There were no adverse events reported after 24 weeks of usage.
A randomized double blind placebo controlled study was conducted with 39 obese subjects (BMI 30-43) who were randomly allocated to receive either 1500 mg of Phase 2 or an identical placebo twice daily with lunch and dinner for 8 weeks . The active group received a total of 3000 mg Phase 2 per day. Subjects were instructed to consume a controlled high fiber/low fat diet that provided 100 to 200 g of complex carbohydrate intake per day. Subjects were also instructed to eat the majority of their carbohydrates during lunch and dinner since those were the meals at which the Phase 2 or placebo were taken. The amount of carbohydrate intake was determined for the subjects on the basis of their estimated daily maintenance carbohydrate requirement. Twenty seven subjects completed the study (14 active and 13 placebo). After 8 weeks the active group lost an average of 3.79 lbs. (an average of 0.47 lbs. per week) compared with the placebo group which lost an average of 1.65 lbs. (an average of 0.21 lbs. per week). The difference was not statistically significant with a two tailed p-value of 0.35. Triglyceride levels in the Phase 2 group were reduced by an average of 26.3 mg/dl. This reduction was more than three times the average reduction of 8.2 mg/dl seen in the placebo group (p = 0.07).
Several secondary outcomes were measured during the study including body fat percentage, waist and hip circumferences, energy level, hunger, appetite, HbA1c, and total cholesterol. For each of these secondary measures, no clinically or statistically significant differences were identified between the active and the placebo group. No adverse events occurred that were felt to be due to the active product. One placebo subject experienced abdominal pain, bloating and gas while one active group subject complained of an increased incidence of tension headaches. There were no clinically significant changes in biochemical indicators of safety, including serum electrolytes, and markers of kidney and liver function .
Weight loss - open studies
An open study was conducted with 10 healthy subjects (5 men and 5 women) with a BMI between 23 and 30 and a body fat ratio of over 25% for men and over 30% for women . The subjects took 3 capsules of Phaseolamin™ 1600 diet twice a day, 30 min before lunch and dinner, for 8 weeks. The six capsules (1.5 g) contained 750 mg Phase 2, 200 mg clove, 20 mg lysine, 20 mg arginine, 20 mg alanine.
Over the course of 8 weeks, caloric intake decreased from 1742 ± 254 kcal/day to 1525 ± 249 kcal/day (p = 0.01) and the subjects lost a significant amount of weight (2.4% 74.5 ± 7.3 to 72.7 ± 7.8 p = 0.002). There were also a significant reduction in body fat (p < 0.001) and BMI (p = 0.002). There were reductions in waist and of hip circumferences, without a significant change in the ratio of waist to hip circumference. Over the 8 weeks there were significant reductions in systolic and diastolic blood pressure (p = 0.01 and p < 0.001). There were also significant reductions in triglycerides (p = 0.019) and HDL cholesterol (p = 0.001), but not in total cholesterol or LDL cholesterol. There was no change in blood glucose levels and no adverse events were reported .
An open study was conducted with 50 healthy adult subjects who were overweight or obese. They were given Precarb (Natrol's Carb Intercept 500 mg capsules) containing Phaseolamin/Phase2 . The subject took 1 g Precarb (2 capsules, 3 times daily with high carbohydrate meals) for 30 days. A per-protocol analysis was conducted on the 37 to 39 subjects who completed the study. There was a significant reduction in mean body weight of 2.34 ± 2.21 kg (n = 37 p < 0.001) and a significant reduction in mean waist-to-hip ratio 2.77 ± 2.55 (n = 39 p < 0.001).
In an open label study 23 adult men and women (BMI 22) took "Super Bows Diet Type B", a granular food available in Japan that contains 500 mg Phase 2, Coleus forskohlii extract and mushroom chitosan (Plus fort Barrious ® ) for a period of 8 weeks . Bows Diet Type B was taken as 1 packet of powder in a glass of water 20 minutes before lunch and dinner. After 8 weeks, the product caused a significant decrease in body weight (0.78 ± 0.20 kg, p < 0.01) and percent body fat (1.19 ± 0.37%, p < 0.01). There was no change on calorie intake during this period. In 10 subjects who had a BMI over 24 and a total cholesterol over 220 mg/dl, there was a significant decrease in cholesterol after 4 and 8 weeks (25.3 ± 7.1 mg/dl and 11.3 ± 4.0 mg/dl, respectively both p < 0.05). There were temporary gastrointestinal symptoms such as bloating and constipation but these symptoms disappeared following a few days of continuous intake of the product.
Glycemic Index (GI)
Four cross-over clinical studies addressed the potential effect of Phase 2 on post-prandial increases in blood sugar. All four studies indicated that Phase 2 could reduce post-prandial spikes in blood sugar with a suggestion that the effect is dose-related.
In the first study, a placebo-controlled, cross-over study, eleven fasting subjects (men and women aged 21 to 57) were given 4 slices of white bread and 42 g (3 Tbs) of margarine with or without 1500 mg of Phase 2 (the Phase 2 was added to the margarine) . The food contained a total of 610 calories, 60.5 of which came from carbohydrate. The tests were administered a week apart. Absorption and metabolism of carbohydrate was measured as levels of plasma glucose over time. In comparison to control, the glucose levels following consumption of Phase 2 returned to baseline 20 minutes earlier. The area under the plasma glucose vs. time curve was 66% lower with Phase 2 compared to the control (p < 0.05). The authors concluded that this indicated that 1/3 rd of the carbohydrate in the bread was absorbed. However, actual absorption and subsequent excretion was not measured.
The second study, published in the same paper, was also a placebo-controlled, cross-over study. Seven subjects (men and women 23 to 43 years old) were given a frozen dinner containing country fried steak, mash potatoes, green beans and cherry-apple pie (630 calories with 64 g carbohydrate) with and without 750 mg Phase 2. In this study, the Phase 2 was mixed with the gravy. The effect of Phase 2 was to reduce the average plasma glucose vs. time curve by 28% and the authors concluded that 2/3rds of the carbohydrate in the meal was absorbed. The authors noted that there appeared to be a dose-related effect with the 1500 mg dose of Phase 2 being twice as effective as the 750 mg dose .
A 6-arm crossover study was conducted with 13 randomized subjects (BMI 18-25) to determine whether the addition of Phase 2 would lower the GI of a commercially available high glycemic food (white bread) . Standardized GI testing was performed using capillary blood glucose measurements following ingestions of white bread with butter, with and without the addition of Phase 2 in capsule or powder form. In both formulations, Phase 2 was given in dosages of 1500 mg, 2000 mg, and 3000 mg. The powdered form was mixed with the butter. Statistical analysis was performed by one-way ANOVA of all seven treatment groups using unadjusted multiple comparisons (t tests) to the white bread control. For the capsule formulation, the 1500 mg dose had no effect on the GI and the 2000 mg and 3000 mg capsule doses caused insignificant reductions in GI. For the powder, the 1500 mg and 2000 mg doses caused insignificant reductions in the GI, while the 3000 mg dose caused a significant reduction in post-prandial glucose levels (a reduction of 34.11%, p = 0.023).
A single dose double-blind cross-over test was conducted on the effects of Super Bows Diet Type B on blood sugar levels . As previously stated, this product is a granular food available in Japan that contains 500 mg Phase 2, Coleus forskohlii extract and mushroom chitosan. The experiment included 13 men and women with a fasting blood glucose level above 126 mg/dl. In two test periods 1 week apart, the subjects took a packet of product or placebo along with a glass of water 5 minutes before eating 300 g polished rice. Blood samples were taken before the intake of the rice and 30, 60, 90 and 120 minutes afterward. Blood sugar levels 30 minutes after eating the rice were significantly lower with the test product (p < 0.01). Plasma insulin levels were significantly lower compared to the control at 30 and 60 minutes after consuming the rice (p < 0.01).
In the human clinical studies reviewed above there were no reports of serious side effects resulting from ingestion of white bean extracts. Clinical efficacy studies using doses of Phase 2 up to 3000 mg per day in divided doses for periods of 30 days to 24 weeks also reported no significant adverse events. An acute animal toxicity study was conducted in rats with Phase 2 at doses of 500 to 5000 mg/kg body weight along with a subchronic study of 90 days with doses of 200 to 1000 mg/kg. In response, there were no adverse reactions and signs of toxicity in biochemical and histopathological analysis . A 28-day toxicity study conducted with male and female rats reported a no-adverse-effect level (NOAEL) of 2500 mg/kg/day . Cantox Health Sciences International conducted a safety review of published and unpublished data on Phase 2 and the panel of experts concluded that it could be safety consumed at doses up to 10 g per day .
Since alpha-amylase inhibitors prevent the degradation of complex carbohydrates into oligosaccharies, those carbohydrates will pass through the intestine into the colon. In the colon, bacteria will digest the complex carbohydrates, and this may initially cause gastrointestinal side-effects such as flatulence and diarrhea. In the study conducted with Super Bows Diet Type B which contained Phase 2 along with other ingredients, there were temporary gastrointestinal symptoms including bloating and constipation but these symptoms resolved with continued intake of the product .
Raw beans contain phytohaemagglutinin (PHA) at high levels which have been associated with toxic effects in animals and severe gastrointestinal disturbances in humans . However, PHA levels in beans are drastically reduced by cooking. In addition, white beans have negligible amounts of PHA compared to colored beans. Phase 2 is a standardized white bean extract prepared using a specialized process which substantially inactivates haemagglutinating activity (HA) and trypsin inhibiting activity (TIA). The finished product contains less than 700 HA units per g and less than 20 TIA units per mg dry weight .
This review is focused on the development and clinical research of a proprietary product, Phase 2 Carb Controller (Pharmachem Laboratories, Kearny, NJ). We felt it was important to focus on this product as there is no evidence that carbohydrate blockers are equivalent. Early studies on the alpha-amylase inhibitor from white bean indicated that enzyme stabilization through specific manufacturing processes was key to an active product. The challenge of establishing biological equivalency for protein biopharmaceuticals has been highlighted in recent publications. The complexity of these molecules, and their production in living cells, makes the final product sensitive to changes in manufacturing conditions. Because of this, the European Medicine Agency has introduced a new regulatory pathway for biosimilars (also known as follow-on biologics) which mandates clinical trials in order to show therapeutic equivalence . In the US, companies are expected to use the approval process for new branded drugs . While the Phase 2 product is a dietary supplement, and not a pharmaceutical, we believe similar principals apply.
40 Terror Plots Foiled Since 9/11: Combating Complacency in the Long War on Terror
Abstract: In 2007, The Heritage Foundation became the first and only organization tracking thwarted terrorist attacks against the United States. That year, Heritage reported that at least 19 publicly known terrorist attacks against the United States had been foiled since 9/11. Today, that number stands at 40. The fact that the United States has not suffered a large-scale attack since 9/11 truly speaks to the country’s counterterrorism successes. However, simply applauding the achievement and taking only a forward-looking approach is not nearly enough to prevent the next attack. Reviewing the terrorist plots that have been foiled since 9/11 can provide valuable information for understanding the nature of the threat, as well as best practices for preventing the next attack.
On the eve of the 10th anniversary of 9/11, it is important to take stock of what the government must do to ensure that America never experiences another such terrorist attack. There is little doubt that the United States is safer than it was on September 10, 2001—at least 40 terror plots against the U.S. have been foiled since 9/11—but the war on terrorism is not yet won. As heartening as it is that so many plots have been foiled, their number also points to the magnitude of the ongoing threat that must not be ignored. In order to continue America’s success in fighting terrorism and protecting the nation, America must not allow itself to become complacent. Instead, Congress and the Administration should:
- Preserve existing counterterrorism and intelligence tools, such as the PATRIOT Act
- Plug gaps in procedures for halting terrorist travel
- Create a lawful detainment framework for the incapacitation and interrogation of suspected terrorists
- Remain committed to Afghanistan and use a policy mix of inducements and penalties to hold Pakistan accountable for rooting out terrorists on its soil
- Eliminate senseless security measures, such as the biometric exit program and 100 percent cargo screening requirements
- Examine information-sharing gaps
40 Foiled Plots
Compiled by The Heritage Foundation since 2007, the following list outlines those publicly known terrorist plots against the U.S. that have been foiled since 9/11. While all categories of terrorist attacks against U.S. targets at home and overseas have been declining steadily since 2005, thwarted plots have more than doubled during the same period, showing that terrorists continue to plan to harm the United States and its people.
1. Richard Reid—December 2001. A British citizen and self-professed follower of Osama bin Laden who trained in Afghanistan, Richard Reid hid explosives inside his shoes before boarding a flight from Paris to Miami on which he attempted to light the fuse with a match. Reid was caught in the act and apprehended aboard the plane by passengers and flight attendants. FBI officials took Reid into custody after the plane made an emergency landing at Boston’s Logan International Airport.
In 2003, Reid was found guilty on charges of terrorism, and a U.S. federal court sentenced him to life in prison. He is currently incarcerated at a federal maximum-security prison in Colorado.
Saajid Badat was sentenced to 13 years in jail for planning to blow up a passenger plane. The 26-year-old, a religious teacher from Gloucester, was sentenced after he admitted conspiring with fellow Briton Reid. Badat pled guilty in February to the plot to blow up the transatlantic flight on its way to the U.S. in 2001.
2. Jose Padilla—May 2002. U.S. officials arrested Jose Padilla in May 2002 at Chicago’s O’Hare airport as he returned to the United States from Pakistan, where he met with 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and received al-Qaeda training and instructions. Upon his arrest, he was initially charged as an enemy combatant, and for planning to use a dirty bomb (an explosive laced with radioactive material) in an attack in the U.S.
Along with Padilla, Adham Amin Hassoun and Kifah Wael Jayyousi were convicted in August of terrorism conspiracy and material support. It was found that the men supported cells that sent recruits, money, and supplies to Islamic extremists worldwide, including al-Qaeda members. Hassoun was the recruiter and Jayyousi served as a financier and propagandist in the cell. Before his conviction, Padilla had brought a case against the federal government claiming that he had been denied the right of habeas corpus (the right of an individual to petition his unlawful imprisonment). In a five-to-four decision, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the case against him had been filed improperly. In 2005, the government indicted Padilla for conspiring against the U.S. with Islamic terrorist groups.
In August 2007, Padilla was found guilty by a civilian jury after a three-month trial. He was later sentenced by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida to 17 years and four months in prison. He is being held at the same penitentiary as Richard Reid.
3. Lackawanna Six—September 2002. When the FBI arrested Sahim Alwan, Yahya Goba, Yasein Taher, Faysal Galab, Shafal Mosed, and Mukhtar al-Bakri in Upstate New York, the press dubbed them the “Lackawanna Six,” the “Buffalo Six,” and the “Buffalo Cell.” Five of the six had been born and raised in Lackawanna, New York. All six are American citizens of Yemeni descent, and stated that they were going to Pakistan to attend a religious camp, but attended an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan instead. The six men pled guilty in 2003 to providing support to al-Qaeda. Goba and al-Bakri were sentenced to 10 years in prison, Taher and Mosed to eight years, Alwan to nine and a half years, and Galab to seven years. Goba’s sentence was later reduced to nine years after he, Alwan, and Taher testified at a Guantanamo Bay military tribunal in the case against Osama bin Laden’s chief propagandist, Ali Hamza al-Bahlul.
Jaber Elbaneh, one of the FBI’s most wanted and often considered to be a seventh member of the Lackawanna cell, reportedly has been captured in Yemen. It remains to be seen whether he will be tried in the U.S., since the U.S. does not have an extradition treaty with Yemen.
4. Iyman Faris—May 2003. Iyman Faris is a naturalized U.S. citizen, originally from Kashmir, who was living in Columbus, Ohio. He was arrested for conspiring to use blowtorches to collapse the Brooklyn Bridge, a plot devised after meetings with al-Qaeda leadership, including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. The New York City Police Department learned of the plot and increased police surveillance around the bridge. Faced with the additional security, Faris and his superiors called off the attack.
Faris pled guilty to conspiracy and providing material support to al-Qaeda and was later sentenced in federal district court to 20 years in prison, the maximum allowed under his plea agreement.
5. Virginia Jihad Network—June 2003. Eleven men were arrested in Alexandria, Virginia, for weapons counts and for violating the Neutrality Acts, which prohibit U.S. citizens and residents from attacking countries with which the United States is at peace. Four of the 11 men pled guilty. Upon further investigation, the remaining seven were indicted on additional charges of conspiring to support terrorist organizations. They were found to have connections with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, a terrorist organization that targets the Indian government. The authorities stated that the Virginia men had used paintball games to train and prepare for battle. The group had also acquired surveillance and night vision equipment and wireless video cameras. Two more men were later indicted in the plot: Ali al-Timimi, the group’s spiritual leader, and Ali Asad Chandia.
Ali al-Timimi was found guilty of soliciting individuals to assault the United States and was sentenced to life in prison. Ali Asad Chandia received 15 years for supporting Lashkar-e-Tayyiba. Randall Todd Royer, Ibrahim al-Hamdi, Yong Ki Kwon, Khwaja Mahmood Hasan, Muhammed Aatique, and Donald T. Surratt pled guilty and were sentenced to prison terms ranging from three years and 10 months to 20 years. Masoud Khan, Seifullah Chapman, and Hammad Abdur-Raheem were found guilty and later sentenced to prison terms ranging from 52 months to life. Both Caliph Basha Ibn Abdur-Raheem and Sabri Benkhala were acquitted at trial.
6. Nuradin M. Abdi—November 2003. Nuradin M. Abdi, a Somali citizen living in Columbus, Ohio, was arrested and charged in a plot to bomb a local shopping mall. Abdi was an associate of convicted terrorists Christopher Paul and Iyman Faris and admitted to conspiring with the two to provide material support to terrorists. Following his arrest, Abdi admitted to traveling overseas to seek admittance to terrorist training camps, as well as meeting with a Somali warlord associated with Islamists.
Abdi has since pled guilty to conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists, one of the four counts for which he was indicted. He was subsequently sentenced to 10 years in jail per the terms of a plea agreement.
7. Dhiren Barot—August 2004. Seven members of a terrorist cell led by Dhiren Barot were arrested for plotting to attack the New York Stock Exchange and other financial institutions in New York, Washington, D.C., and Newark, New Jersey. They were later accused of planning attacks in England. The plots included a “memorable black day of terror” that would have included detonating a dirty bomb. A July 2004 police raid on Barot’s house in Pakistan yielded a number of incriminating files on a laptop computer, including instructions for building car bombs.
Barot pled guilty and was convicted in the United Kingdom for conspiracy to commit mass murder and sentenced to 40 years. However, in May 2007, his sentence was reduced to 30 years. His seven co-conspirators were sentenced to terms ranging from 15 to 26 years on related charges of conspiracy to commit murder and conspiracy to cause explosion.
8. James Elshafay and Shahawar Matin Siraj—August 2004. James Elshafay and Shahawar Matin Siraj, both reportedly self-radicalized, were arrested for plotting to bomb a subway station near Madison Square Garden in New York City before the Republican National Convention. An undercover detective from the New York City Police Department’s Intelligence Division infiltrated the group, providing information to authorities, and later testified against Elshafay and Siraj.
Siraj was convicted and sentenced to 30 years in prison. Elshafay, a U.S. citizen, pled guilty and received a lighter, five-year sentence for testifying against his co-conspirator.
9. Yassin Aref and Mohammad Hossain—August 2004. Two leaders of a mosque in Albany, New York, were charged with plotting to purchase a shoulder-fired grenade launcher to assassinate a Pakistani diplomat. An investigation by the FBI, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and local police contributed to the arrest. With the help of an informant, the FBI set up a sting that lured Mohammad Hossain into a fake terrorist conspiracy. Hossain brought Yassin Aref, a Kurdish refugee, as a witness. The informant offered details of a fake terrorist plot, claiming that he needed the missiles to murder a Pakistani diplomat in New York City. Both Aref and Hossain agreed to help.
Aref and Hossain were found guilty of money laundering and conspiracy to conceal material support for terrorism and were sentenced to 15 years in prison.
10. Hamid Hayat—June 2005. Hamid Hayat, a Pakistani immigrant, was arrested in Lodi, California, after allegedly lying to the FBI about his attendance at an Islamic terrorist training camp in Pakistan.
Hamid was found guilty of providing himself as “material support” to terrorists and three counts of providing false statements to the FBI. In interviews with the FBI, he stated (correctly) that he specifically requested to come to the United States after receiving training in order to carry out jihad. He was sentenced to 24 years in prison.
11. Levar Haley Washington, Gregory Vernon Patterson, Hammad Riaz Samana, and Kevin James—August 2005. The members of the group were arrested in Los Angeles and charged with conspiring to attack National Guard facilities, synagogues, and other targets in the Los Angeles area. Kevin James allegedly founded Jamiyyat ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS), a radical Islamic prison group, and converted Levar Washington and others to the group’s mission. The JIS allegedly planned to finance its operations by robbing gas stations. After Washington and Patterson were arrested for robbery, police and federal agents began a terrorist investigation, and a search of Washington’s apartment revealed a target list.
James and Washington pled guilty in December 2007. James was sentenced to 16 years in prison and Washington to 22 years. Patterson received 151 months, while Samana was found unfit to stand trial and was initially detained in a federal prison mental facility. He was later sentenced to 70 months in jail.
12. Michael C. Reynolds—December 2005. Michael C. Reynolds was arrested by the FBI and charged with involvement in a plot to blow up a Wyoming natural gas refinery the Transcontinental Pipeline, a natural-gas pipeline from the Gulf Coast to New York and New Jersey and a Standard Oil refinery in New Jersey. He was arrested while trying to pick up a $40,000 payment for planning the attack. Shannen Rossmiller, his purported contact, was a Montana judge and private citizen working with the FBI. Rossmiller posed as a jihadist, tricking Reynolds into revealing his plan. The FBI later found explosives in a storage locker in Reynolds’s hometown of Wilkes–Barre, Pennsylvania. Reynolds claimed that he was doing much the same as Rossmiller, and was working as a private citizen to find terrorists.
Reynolds was convicted of providing material support to terrorists, soliciting a crime of violence, unlawful distribution of explosives, and unlawful possession of a hand grenade. He was sentenced to 30 years in prison.
13. Mohammad Zaki Amawi, Marwan Othman El-Hindi, and Zand Wassim Mazloum—February 2006. Amawi, El-Hindi, and Mazloum were arrested in Toledo, Ohio, for conspiring to kill people outside the United States, including U.S. Armed Forces personnel serving in Iraq. The men also conspired to train and arm for a violent jihad against the United States, both domestically and abroad. Training involved use of materials including those found on secure and exclusive jihadist Web sites, downloaded and copied training videos, and materials for jihad training sessions. The men also were found to have provided material support to terrorist organizations and to have verbally threatened attacks on President George W. Bush. The investigation was begun with the help of an informant who was approached to help train the group.
In June 2008, the three men were convicted of conspiring to commit acts of terrorism against Americans overseas, including U.S. military personnel in Iraq, and other terrorism-related violations. Amawi was sentenced to 20 years, El-Hindi to 13 years, and Mazloum to approximately eight years.
14. Syed Haris Ahmed and Ehsanul Islam Sadequee—April 2006. Ahmed and Sadequee, from Atlanta, Georgia, were accused of conspiracy, having discussed terrorist targets with alleged terrorist organizations. They allegedly met with Islamic extremists in the U.S. and gathered videotape surveillance of potential targets in the Washington, D.C., area, including the U.S. Capitol and the World Bank headquarters, and sent the videos to a London Islamist group. Ahmed is said also to have traveled to Pakistan with the goal of joining Lashkar-e-Tayyiba.
Both men were indicted for providing material support to terrorist organizations and pled not guilty. In June 2009, a federal district judge found Ahmed “guilty of conspiring to provide material support to terrorists here and overseas.” Ahmed was subsequently sentenced to 13 years in jail. Sadequee was also found guilty and sentenced to 17 years.
15. Narseal Batiste, Patrick Abraham, Stanley Grant Phanor, Naudimar Herrera, Burson Augustin, Lyglenson Lemorin, and Rotschild Augustine—June 2006. Seven men were arrested in Miami and Atlanta for plotting to blow up the Sears Tower in Chicago, FBI offices, and other government buildings around the country. The arrests resulted from an investigation involving an FBI informant. Allegedly, Batiste was the leader of the group and first suggested attacking the Sears Tower in December 2005.
All of the suspects pled not guilty. On December 13, 2007, Lemorin was acquitted of all charges, but the jury failed to reach a verdict on the other six. The second trial ended in a mistrial in April 2008. In the third trial, the jury convicted five of the men on multiple conspiracy charges and acquitted Herrera on all counts. On November 20, 2009, the five were sentenced to prison terms ranging from six to 13.5 years, with Batiste receiving the longest sentence.
16. Assem Hammoud—July 2006. Conducting online surveillance of chat rooms, the FBI discovered a plot to attack underground transit links between New York City and New Jersey. Eight suspects, including Assem Hammoud, an al-Qaeda loyalist living in Lebanon, were arrested for plotting to bomb New York City train tunnels. Hammoud, a self-proclaimed operative for al-Qaeda, admitted to the plot. He was held by Lebanese authorities but was not extradited because the U.S. does not have an extradition treaty with Lebanon. In June 2008, Lebanese authorities released him on bail. He is awaiting trial before a Lebanese military court.
17. Liquid Explosives Plot—August 2006. British law enforcement stopped a terrorist plot to blow up 10 U.S.-bound commercial airliners with liquid explosives. Twenty-four suspects were arrested in the London area. The style of the plot raised speculation that al-Qaeda was behind it, but no concrete evidence has established a link.
The United Kingdom initially indicted 15 of the 24 arrested individuals on charges ranging from conspiring to commit murder to planning to commit terrorist acts. Eventually, in April 2008, only eight men were brought to trial. In September, the jury found none of the defendants guilty of conspiring to target aircraft, but three guilty of conspiracy to commit murder. The jury was unable to reach verdicts on four of the men. One man was found not guilty on all counts.
18. Derrick Shareef—December 2006. Derrick Shareef was arrested on charges of planning to set off hand grenades in a shopping mall outside Chicago. Shareef reportedly acted alone and was arrested after meeting with an undercover Joint Terrorism Task Force agent. FBI reports indicated that the mall was one of several potential targets, including courthouses, city halls, and government facilities. Shareef, however, settled on attacking a mall in the days immediately preceding Christmas because he believed it would cause the greatest amount of chaos and damage. Shareef was also found to have connections to convicted terrorist Hassan Agujihaad, who was charged with attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction and later sentenced to 35 years in prison.
19. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed—March 2007. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, captured in Pakistan in 2003, was involved in a number of terrorist plots and is one of the most senior bin Laden operatives ever captured. He is being held at the U.S. military detention facility in Guantanamo Bay. In March 2007, Mohammed admitted to helping plan, organize, and run the 9/11 attacks. He also claimed responsibility for planning the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and the 2002 bombings of nightclubs in Bali and a Kenyan hotel. He has stated that he was involved in the decapitation of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl and took responsibility for helping to plan the failed shoe-bomb attack by Richard Reid, along with plots to attack Heathrow Airport, Canary Wharf, Big Ben, various targets in Israel, the Panama Canal, Los Angeles, Chicago, the Empire State building, and U.S. nuclear power stations. He had also plotted to assassinate Pope John Paul II and former President Bill Clinton.
In December 2008, Mohammed and his four co-defendants (Ramzi Binalshibh, Mustafa Ahmad al-Hawsawi, Ali Abd al-Aziz Ali, and Walid Bin Attash) told the military tribunal judge that they wanted to confess and plead guilty to all charges. The judge has approved the guilty plea of Mohammed and two co-defendants but has required mental competency hearings before allowing the other two conspirators to plead guilty. In November 2009, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder announced that Mohammed would be relocated to the United States to face a civilian trial in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. That decision has now been reversed and the Administration announced that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the other Guantanamo Bay detainees would be prosecuted in military tribunals at Guantanamo.
20. Fort Dix Plot—May 2007. Six men were arrested in a plot to attack Fort Dix, a U.S. Army post in New Jersey. The plan involved using assault rifles and grenades to attack and kill U.S. soldiers. Five of the alleged conspirators had conducted training missions in the nearby Pocono Mountains. The sixth helped to obtain weapons. The arrests were made after a 16-month FBI operation that included infiltrating the group. The investigation began after a store clerk alerted authorities after discovering a video file of the group firing weapons and calling for jihad. The group has no known direct connections to any international terrorist organization.
In December 2008, five of the men were found guilty on conspiracy charges but were acquitted of charges of attempted murder. Four were also convicted on weapons charges. The five men received sentences ranging from 33 years to life plus 30 years. The sixth co-defendant pled guilty to aiding and abetting the others in illegal possession of weapons and was sentenced to 20 months in jail.
21. JFK Airport Plot—June 2007. Four men plotted to blow up “aviation fuel tanks and pipelines at the John F. Kennedy International Airport” in New York City. They believed that such an attack would cause “greater destruction than in the Sept. 11 attacks.” Authorities stated that the attack “could have caused significant financial and psychological damage, but not major loss of life.”
Russell Defreitas, the leader of the group, was arrested in Brooklyn. The other three members of the group—Abdul Kadir, Kareem Ibrahim, and Abdel Nur—were detained in Trinidad and extradited in June 2008. Kadir and Nur have links to Islamic extremists in South America and the Caribbean. Kadir was an imam in Guyana, a former member of the Guyanese Parliament, and mayor of Linden, Guyana. Ibrahim is a Trinidadian citizen and Nur is a Guyanese citizen.
In 2010, Kadir was found guilty on five counts and sentenced to life in prison. In February, both Defreitas and Nur were also found guilty. Defreitas was sentenced to life in prison, while Nur was sentenced to 15 years. The final conspirator, Kareem Ibrahim, was convicted in May 2011 and faces up to life in prison.
22. Hassan Abujihaad—March 2008. Hassan Abujihaad, a former U.S. Navy sailor from Phoenix, Arizona, was convicted of supporting terrorism and disclosing classified information, including the location of Navy ships and their vulnerabilities, to Babar Ahmad and Syed Talha Ahsan, the alleged administrators of Azzam Publication Web sites (the London organization that provided material support and resources to terrorists). Abujihaad was arrested in March 2007 and pled not guilty to charges of supporting terrorism in April 2007. In May 2008, he was convicted by a jury and sentenced to 10 years in prison. In 2010, his conviction was upheld in a federal court of appeals. Both Babar Ahmad and Syed Talha Ahsan are being held in Britain on anti-terrorism charges and are fighting extradition to the U.S.
23. Christopher Paul—June 2008. Christopher Paul is a U.S. citizen from Columbus, Ohio. He joined al-Qaeda in the 1990s and was involved in conspiracies to target Americans in the United States and overseas. In 1999, he became connected to an Islamic terrorist cell in Germany, where he was involved in a plot to target Americans at foreign vacation resorts. He later returned to Ohio and was subsequently arrested for conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction—specifically, explosive devices—“against targets in Europe and the United States.” Paul pled guilty to the charges and was sentenced to 20 years in prison.
24. Synagogue Terror Plot—May 2009. On May 20, 2009, the New York Police Department announced the arrest of James Cromitie, David Williams, Onta Williams, and Laguerre Payen for plotting to blow up New York-area Jewish centers and shoot down planes at a nearby Air National Guard Base. The four had attempted to gain access to Stinger missiles and were caught in the act of placing bombs in the buildings and in a car. (The bombs were duds, because undercover agents sold the four defendants fake explosives as part of an ongoing sting operation). All four men were found guilty. In June 2011, James Cromitie, David Williams, and Onta Williams were sentenced to 25 years in prison. Laguerre Payen’s sentencing has been postponed pending psychiatric evaluation.
25. Najibullah Zazi—September 2009 . Najibullah Zazi, a 24-year-old Afghane, was arrested after purchasing large quantities of chemicals used to make a TATP bomb, the same type of weapon used in the 2005 bombing of the London Underground and the 2001 shoe-bomb plot. Zazi had traveled to Pakistan, where he received instruction in bomb-making and attended an al-Qaeda training camp. Zazi allegedly planned to detonate TATP bombs on the New York City subway.It has since been found that the plot was directed by senior al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan.
Najibullah Zazi’s father, Mohammed Wali Zazi, was also indicted for obstructing justice, witness tampering, and lying to the FBI in attempts to help his son cover up plans for his attack.A cousin of Zazi, Amanullah Zazi, also publicly admitted that he played a role in Zazi’s 2009 plot. Amanullah pled guilty in secret and agreed to become a government witness in federal court in Brooklyn against Najibullah’s father. The father has since been found guilty, and faces up to 40 years in prison. Najibullah Zazi pled guilty, as the result of a plea bargain, and remains in jail. He is currently awaiting sentencing.
At least three other individuals have since been arrested on allegations of conspiring to carry out the attack with Zazi. One of them, New York religious leader Ahmad Afzali, has pled guilty to charges of lying to federal agents about informing Zazi that he was being investigated by authorities.  As part of a plea deal, Afzali was sentenced to time served and ordered to leave the country within 90 days. A second man, Zarein Ahmedzay has also pled guilty to conspiring to use weapons of mass destruction in the foiled plot and lying to investigators. Adis Medunjanin has pled not guilty to conspiracy to commit murder in a foreign country and to receiving terrorist training. Ahmedzay and Medunjanin are thought to have traveled to Pakistan with Zazi, and to have met with wanted al-Qaeda operative Adnan El Shukrijumah, who has also been charged in the plot. A fourth individual, Abid Nasser, has also been indicated in the plot led by Zazi, as well as other plots in England and Norway. He is currently in the United Kingdom facing extradition to the United States. Also charged in the plot are, Tariq Ur Rehman, and a fifth defendant known as “Ahmad,” “Sohaib,” or “Zahid.” Both El Shukrijumah and Rehman are not in custody.
26. Hosam Maher Husein Smadi —September 2009. Smadi, a 19-year-old Jordanian, was apprehended in an attempt to plant a bomb in a Dallas skyscraper. Originally identified through FBI monitoring of extremist chat rooms, Smadi was arrested and charged after agents posing as terrorist cell members gave Smadi a fake bomb, which he later attempted to detonate. Smadi was found guilty and sentenced to 24 years in prison.
27 . Michael Finton —September 2009. Michael Finton, an American citizen, was arrested on September 23, 2009, by undercover FBI agents after attempting to detonate a car bomb filled with what he believed to be close to one ton of explosives outside the Paul Findley Federal Building and Courthouse in downtown Springfield, Illinois. The blast was also intended to destroy the nearby office of Representative Aaron Schock (D–IL). Evidence presented against Finton has shown that he expressed a desire to become a jihadist fighter and was aware that his planned attack would cause civilian injuries. He has been arrested on charges of attempted murder of federal employees and attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction. Finton pled guilty and was sentenced to 28 years in prison.
28. Tarek Mehanna and Ahmad Abousamra—October 2009. Tarek Mehanna, previously indicted for lying to the FBI about the location of terrorist suspect Daniel Maldonado, was arrested on October 21, 2009, on allegations of conspiracy to kill two U.S. politicians, American troops in Iraq, and civilians in local shopping malls, as well as conspiracy to provide material support to a terrorist organization. Ahmad Abousamra, his co-conspirator, remains at large in Syria. However, both were indicted on charges of providing and conspiring to provide material support to terrorists, conspiracy to kill Americans in a foreign country, and conspiracy to provide false information to law enforcement.
The two men are not believed to be associated with any known terrorist organization. Mehanna has pled not guilty to charges against him, while Abousamra remains at large in Syria.
29. The Christmas Day Bomber—2009. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a 23-year-old Nigerian engineering student living in London, boarded a plane from Nigeria to Amsterdam and then flew from Amsterdam to the U.S. It was on this second flight when he attempted to detonate a bomb hidden in his underwear as the plane began to land. The device ignited but did not detonate, and passengers quickly stopped Abdulmutallab from trying again, leading to his arrest by U.S. authorities upon landing in Detroit. The bomb, containing the explosives PETN and TATP, was similar to the failed device used by Richard Reid in his shoe in 2001.
Media accounts following the plot indicate that Abdulmutallab admits involvement with al-Qaeda in Yemen. He has since pled not guilty to charges including conspiracy to commit an act of terrorism and attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction. He remains in custody in the U.S. awaiting further trial.
30. Raja Lahrasib Khan—March 2010. Chicago taxi driver Raja Lahrasib Khan, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Pakistan, was arrested by the Chicago FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force on two counts of providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization. According to the charges, Khan was affiliated with Ilyas Kashmiri, leader of the al-Qaeda-linked extremist group Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami in Kashmir, and has previously been indicted in the U.S. on terrorism charges.
Khan originally transferred $950 to Pakistan, to be delivered to Kashmiri, and later attempted to send around $1,000 provided to him by an undercover agent to Kashmiri by having his son carry the money to England, where Khan then planned to rendezvous with him and carry the money the rest of the way to Pakistan. His son was stopped by government agents at Chicago’s O’Hare airport before leaving the country. The criminal complaint filed against Khan also alleges that he had discussed plans to bomb an unnamed sports stadium in the United States.
Khan has since pled not guilty to two counts of providing material support to terrorism. If convicted, Khan faces up to 15 years in prison for each count of providing material support.
31. Faisal Shahzad—May 2010. Faisal Shahzad, a naturalized citizen from Pakistan, attempted to detonate explosives in an SUV parked in Times Square. After explosives training in Pakistan, he is said to have received $12,000 from entities affiliated with the terrorist organization Tehrik-e-Taliban to fund the attack. Following the failed bombing attempt, Shahzad attempted to flee the country to Dubai, but was arrested before the flight was able to leave New York’s JFK airport.
Shahzad pled guilty to 10 counts, including conspiracy to commit an act of terrorism and to use a weapon of mass destruction. He was sentenced to life in prison and is being held at the same Colorado maximum-security prison as Richard Reid and Jose Padilla.
32. Paul G. Rockwood, Jr. and Nadia Piroska Maria Rockwood—July 2010. Paul G. Rockwood, Jr., an American citizen, became an adherent to Anwar al-Awlaki’s ideology of violent jihad after converting to Islam. In studying al-Awlaki’s teachings, Rockwood came to believe it was his religious responsibility to seek revenge against anyone who defiled Islam. He created a list of 15 individuals to be targeted for assassination, including several members of the U.S. military. Rockwood is said to have researched explosive techniques and discussed the possibility of killing his targets with a gunshot to the head or through mail bombs. Nadia Piroska Maria Rockwood, Paul’s wife, knowingly transported the list to Anchorage, Alaska, to share with an unnamed individual who apparently shared Rockwood’s ideology. The list then made it into the hands of the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) in Anchorage.
Paul was charged with making false statements to the FBI in a domestic terrorism charge, while Nadia was charged with making false statements to the FBI in connection to the case against her husband. Paul was sentenced to eight years in prison, while his wife was sentenced to five years probation.
33. Farooque Ahmed—October 2010. Pakistani-American Farooque Ahmed was arrested following an FBI investigation into plots to attack the Washington, D.C., subway. Ahmed is said to have conducted surveillance on the D.C. Metrorail system on multiple occasions, and was in contact with undercover FBI agents whom he believed to be individuals affiliated with al-Qaeda. According to an unsealed affidavit, Ahmed wanted to receive terrorist training overseas and become a martyr. The affidavit also indicates that he sought to specifically target military personnel in his bombing attempt.
Ahmed pled guilty to charges of material support and collecting information for a terrorist attack on a transit facility. He was then immediately sentenced to 23 years in prison.
34. Air Cargo Bomb Plot—October 2010. Two packages shipped from Yemen to Chicago-area synagogues were discovered to contain explosive materials of the same type used by Richard Reid and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab in previously thwarted bombing attempts. The packages contained printer cartridges filled with the explosive material and were identified with the help of intelligence tips from Saudi Arabian authorities while in transit on cargo planes in the United Kingdom and Dubai. While no arrests have been made, the Yemen-based Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has claimed responsibility for the failed attack.
35. Mohamed Osman Mohamud—November 2010. Mohamed Osman Mohamud, a 19-year-old Somali-American, was arrested after attempting to detonate a car bomb at a Christmas tree lighting ceremony in Portland, Oregon. The bomb was composed of inert explosives given to him by undercover FBI agents. Mohamud had previously sought to travel overseas to obtain training in violent jihad. Having failed in that attempt, he wanted to commit an attack that would cause mass casualties to individuals and their families. Mohamud has pled not guilty to the charges.
36. Antonio Martinez—December 2010. Antonio Martinez, a 21-year-old American citizen also known as Muhammad Hussain, planned to bomb a military recruiting center in Maryland. The FBI learned of the plot from an unnamed informant. Martinez was arrested after attempting to detonate a fake explosive device supplied by FBI agents. He has been charged with attempted murder of federal officers and employees, as well as attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction. He has pled not guilty and awaits further trial.
37. Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari—February 2011. Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari, a Saudi citizen studying in Lubbock, Texas, was arrested by the FBI after placing an order for the toxic chemical phenol. Both the chemical supplier and the freight shipping company became suspicious of the order, which could be used to make an improvised explosive device (IED), and alerted the FBI and local police. Surveillance of Aldawsari’s e-mail turned up a list of potential “nice targets” including dams, nuclear power plants, military targets, a nightclub, and the Dallas residence of former President George W. Bush. The search also recovered plans to acquire a forged U.S. birth certificate and multiple driver’s licenses. Aldawsari seems to have considered using these documents to obtain rental cars for use in vehicle bombings. He has pled not guilty to charges of attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction and faces up to life in prison.
38. Ahmed Ferhani and Mohamed Mamdouh—May 2011. Ahmed Ferhani of Algeria, and Moroccan-born Mohamed Mamdouh, a U.S. citizen, were arrested by the New York Police Department after attempting to purchase a hand grenade, guns, and ammunition to attack on an undetermined Manhattan synagogue. The men planned on disguising themselves as Orthodox Jews in order to sneak into the synagogue. Reports have also cited the Empire State Building as a possible second target. Both men face charges of conspiracy to commit a crime of terrorism and conspiracy to commit a hate crime, as well as criminal possession of a weapon.
39. Abu Khalid Abdul-Latif and Walli Mujahidh—June 2011. In a raid on a warehouse in Seattle, the FBI arrested Abu Khalid Abdul-Latif and Walli Mujahidh. The two suspects had arranged to purchase weapons from an unnamed informant in contact with the Seattle Police Department. They were looking to purchase automatic machine guns and grenades in preparation for an attack on a military recruiting station in Seattle. Since the arrests have been made, authorities have learned that Abdul-Latif, a felon and Muslim convert, had initially planned to attack the Joint Base Lewis–McChord with his friend, Los Angeles resident Mujahidh. The target was later changed to the Seattle Military Entrance Processing Station for undisclosed reasons. 
The men have been charged with conspiracy to murder officers and employees of the United States government, conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction, and possession of firearms in furtherance of crimes of violence. Abdul-Latif has also been charged with two counts of illegal possession of firearms. Both men are in custody awaiting trial.
40. Emerson Winfield Begolly—August 2011. Begolly, a moderator and supporter for the internationally known Islamic extremist Web forum Ansar al-Mujahideen English Forum (AMEF), was arrested on charges of terrorist actions involving solicitation to commit a crime of violence and distribution of information in relation to explosives, destructive devices, and weapons of mass destruction. Through his profile on AMEF, the Pennsylvania-born man solicited others to engage in violent acts of terrorism against post offices, water plants, military facilities, bridges, train lines, and Jewish schools. Begolly also used the Web site to post a downloadable 101-page document that contains information on how to manufacture chemical explosives. The instructional document is loosely linked to al-Qaeda’s former top chemical and biological weapons expert Abu Khabbab al Misri. Begolly pled guilty to counts of soliciting others to engage in acts of terrorism within the U.S., and attempting to use a 9-mm semi-automatic handgun during an assault upon inquiring FBI agents. He is currently awaiting further trial.
- Plug gaps in procedures for halting terrorist travel. The problem in stopping terrorist travel to the U.S. is not airport screening per se. Turning every airport into another Maginot Line or Fort Knox will fail at some point. Instead, the best way to discourage terrorists is to frustrate the groups or individuals long before they are able to put the American public in danger. Until the terrorists are rooted out, the free nations under threat from global terrorism have to do a better job of thwarting terrorist travel. Would-be mass murderers like Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (the Detroit-bound Christmas bomber) should not be allowed near an airliner. At the very least, such suspicious travelers should not be able to move freely without greater scrutiny, inspection, and surveillance. In order to plug gaps in terrorist travel, the U.S. should improve visa security coordination between the Departments of State and Homeland Security, put more air marshals in the skies and in airports, speed up the deployment of the Secure Flight program, step up implementation of REAL ID, expand the Visa Waiver Program, and end the 100 percent visa interview requirement. Efforts should also be made to improve the Terrorist Watchlist, including ensuring that the intelligence community has complete information access in real time, the implementation of “Person-centric” travel histories, and the incorporation of data obtained from abroad by Immigration and Custom Enforcement’s Visa Security Units at U.S. embassies and consulates.
- Create a lawful detainment framework for the incapacitation and lawful interrogation of terrorists. As of August 2011, the United States is holding 171 detainees at Guantanamo Bay. Under the international law of armed conflict, or law of war, and as recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court, the United States has the authority to detain enemies who have engaged in combatant actions, including acts of belligerence, until the end of hostilities to keep them from returning to the battlefield. Military detention, authorized by Congress and properly calibrated to protect national security, will enhance the nation’s ability to prosecute this war. The Commander in Chief should have all tools available to defeat this enemy, including the ability to determine whom to capture, where to detain them, whether to prosecute via military commissions or federal court, and whom to release. Efforts by Congress to unnecessarily restrict the Commander in Chief in these areas are problematic and should be avoided. At the same time, the Administration should continue to use Guantanamo as the default detention facility for high-value captures, including future captures and dangerous high-value detainees currently in custody in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- Remain committed to Afghanistan and use a policy mix of inducements and penalties to hold Pakistan accountable for rooting out terrorists on its soil. Terrorism is a global threat that requires a global response. Al-Qaeda’s core leadership remains in Pakistan’s tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, and the Taliban (whose leadership is allied with al-Qaeda) continues to threaten stability in Afghanistan. In order to stop terrorism at its source, the U.S. must remain committed to its counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, which aims to prevent the Taliban from regaining influence in the region. Continued pressure on the Pakistani government to shut down Pakistan-based terrorist groups is also essential, as are efforts to work with other nations to halt terrorist financing and eliminate terrorist safe havens.
- Eliminate senseless security measures. Senseless security measures that are unworkable or add little value consume scarce resources and do not keep Americans safe. These include the national biometric exit program, the 100 percent interview requirement for all visa applicants, and the mandate requiring 100 percent scanning of inbound transoceanic shipping containers. These programs demand enormous investments in tools and technology while providing little commensurate benefits in combating terrorist travel or enforcing U.S. laws. Simply throwing money at the problem is not the answer and only serves to provide a false sense of security. Rather than continuing to promote senseless security measures, Congress and the Administration should return to a truly risk-based approach to homeland security.
- Examine information-sharing gaps. Efforts to increase information sharing between the U.S. and its allies while improving interagency communications between the Departments of State, Justice, and Homeland Security and intelligence agencies are vital to protecting the U.S. from the continued threat of terrorism. One of the central failures leading up to the attempted 2009 Christmas Day airplane bombing was the lack of sufficient information sharing between entities across the government. Information sharing must be strengthened both domestically and internationally to allow the early detection of terror plots long before the American public is put at risk.
Nearly 10 years after 9/11, there is little doubt that the nation is safer than it was on September 10, 2001. But the fact that the United States has thwarted at least 40 terror plots since 9/11 shows that terrorists continue to plan to harm the United States and kill Americans. Using lessons learned, better counterterrorism mechanisms, and new intelligence data are invaluable. Good leadership to keep America safe is nothing less than the American people deserve.
—James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., is Deputy Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Davis Institute, at The Heritage Foundation. Jessica Zuckerman is a Research Assistant in the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation.
Since 2007, The Heritage Foundation has continuously refined the data provided in this report. In this latest report, one previously included plot (involving Awais Younis and one co-conspirator Umer Hayat) have been removed from the list due to new information. With the addition of the two newest plots, the count of foiled attacks against the United States since 9/11 is 40. It is also worth noting that there have been three successful terrorist attacks against the United States since 9/11: (1) the shooting at the Little Rock military recruiting center in 2009, (2) the Los Angeles airport ticket counter shooting in 2002, and (3) the Fort Hood shooting in 2009, during which 16 people were killed.
Pam Belluck, “Crew Grabs Man Explosive Feared,” The New York Times, December 23, 2001, at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/23/us/crew-grabs-man-explosive-feared.html (May 5, 2011).
Fergal Parkinson, “‘Shoe Bomber’ Defiant After Life Sentence,” BBC, January 31, 2003, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2712445.stm (May 10, 2011), and Maria Ressa, “Sources: Reid Is Al Qaeda Operative,” CNN, December 6, 2003, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/01/30/reid.alqaeda(May 5, 2011).
“Shoebomb Plotter Given 13 Years,” BBC News, April 22, 2005, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4474307.stm(September 1, 2011).
 Jose Padilla v. C. T. Hanft, U.S.N. Commander, Consolidated Naval Brig., United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, No. 05-6396, September 9, 2005, at http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/padilla/padhnft90905opn4th.pdf(May 5, 2011).
“Profile: Jose Padilla,” BBC, August 16, 2007, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2037444.stm(May 5, 2011).
 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
Kirk Semple, “Padilla Gets 17 Years in Conspiracy Case,” The New York Times, January 23, 2008, at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/23/us/23padilla.html (May 5, 2011).
Michael Powell, “No Choice But Guilty,” The Washington Post, July 23, 2008.
Roya Aziz and Monica Lam, “Profiles: The Lackawanna Cell,” PBS Frontline, October 16, 2003, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/sleeper/inside/profiles.html (May 5, 2011).
 Lou Michel, “U.S. Gives Half of the Lackawanna Six a Fresh Start,” The Buffalo News, August 20, 2010, at http://www.buffalonews.com/incoming/article159216.ece (September 2, 2011).
Eric Lichtblau and Monica Davey, “Threats and Responses: Terror Suspect in Plot on Bridge Drew Interest Earlier,” The New York Times, June 21, 2003, at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/21/us/threats-and-responses-terror-suspect-in-plot-on-bridge-drew-interest-earlier.html (May 5, 2011).
Eric Lichtblau, “Trucker Sentenced to 20 Years in Plot Against Brooklyn Bridge,” The New York Times, October 29, 2003, at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/29/us/trucker-sentenced-to-20-years-in-plot-against-brooklyn-bridge.html (May 5, 2011).
Jerry Markon and Mary Beth Sheridan, “Indictment Expands ‘Va. Jihad’ Charges,” The Washington Post, September 26, 2003, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A2730-2003Sep25.html (May 5, 2011).
Jerry Markon, “Teacher Sentenced for Aiding Terrorists,” The Washington Post, August 26, 2006, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/25/AR2006082500460.html (May 5, 2011).
Markon and Sheridan, “Indictment Expands ‘Va. Jihad’ Charges,” and press release, “‘Virginia Jihad’ Member Sentenced to 121 Months in Prison,” U.S. Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of Virginia, July 24, 2007, at http://www.justice.gov/usao/vae/Pressreleases/07-JulyPDFArchive/07/20070724benkahlanr.html (May 5, 2011). Royer was sentenced to 20 years in prison, al-Hamdi to 15 years, Kwon to 11.5 years, Hasan to 11.5 years, Aatique to 10 years and two months, and Surratt to three years and 10 months. Khan was sentenced to life in prison, Chapman to 65 years, and Abdur-Raheem to 52 months.
Press release, “Randall Todd Royer and Ibrahim Ahmed al-Hamdi Sentenced for Participation in Virginia Jihad Network,” U.S. Department of Justice, April 9, 2004, at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2004/April/04_crm_225.htm (May 5, 2011).
Press release, “Ohio Man Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to Terrorists,” U.S. Department of Justice, July 31, 2007, at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/July/07_nsd_568.html (May 5, 2011).
“Bomb Scare Has Echoes of Earlier Plots,” CNN, June 30, 2007, at http://edition2.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/europe/06/29/uk.plots/index.html (May 5, 2011).
“Al-Qaeda Plotter Jailed for Life,” BBC, November 7, 2006, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6123236.stm (May 5, 2011).
“‘Dirty Bomb’ Man’s Sentence Cut,” BBC, April 16, 2007, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6661371.stm (April 19, 2010).
“Al-Qaeda Bomb Plot Commander’s Team Follow Him to Prison,” The Sunday Times, June 16, 2007, at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article1940271.ece (May 5, 2011).
Press release, “Shahawar Matin Siraj Convicted of Conspiring to Place Explosives at the 34th Street Subway Station,” U.S. Attorney’s Office Eastern District of New York, May 24, 2006, at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nye/pr/2006/2006may24.html (May 5, 2011).
Jarrett Murphy, “2 Men Snared in Missile Sting: Mosque Leaders Charged with Trying to Buy Missile from Government Informer,” CBS News, August 5, 2004, at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/08/05/terror/main634339.shtml (May 5, 2011).
 United States of America v. Yassin Muhiddin Aref and Muhammed Mosharref Hossain, United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, August 5, 2004, at http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/albany/usaref80504cmp.pdf (May 10, 2011).
Adam Liptak, “Spying Program May Be Tested by Terror Case,” The New York Times, August 26, 2007, at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/26/us/26wiretap.html (May 5, 2011).
Press release, “Hamid Hayat Sentenced to 24 Years in Connection with Terrorism Charges,” U.S. Department of Justice, September 10, 2007, at http://justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/September/07_nsd_700.html(May 5, 2011).
 U.S. v. Hamid Hayat and Umer Hayat, criminal complaint, FindLaw, June 7, 2005, at http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/terrorism/ushayat607056.html(September 1, 2011).
Carolyn Marshall, “24-Year Term for Californian in Terrorism Training Case,” The New York Times, September 11, 2007, at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/11/us/11lodi.html (May 5, 2011).
“Four Charged with Hatching Prison Terror Plot: California Inmates Allegedly Created Extremist Muslim Gang Behind Bars,” MSNBC, August 31, 2005, at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9148467 (May 5, 2011).
Rachanee Srisavasdi, “Man Sentenced for Role in Plot to Kill Jews, Attack Military Bases,” The Orange County Register, August 17, 2009, at http://www.ocregister.com/news/samana-168436-months-carney.html (May 5, 2011).
”U.S. Man Sentenced to 30 Years in Plot to Blow Up Pipelines,” International Herald Tribune, November 6, 2007.
Jeremy Grad, “Reynolds Gets 30 Years in Terror Plot,” Times Leader (Wilkes–Barre, Pa.), November 7, 2007.
“U.S. Man Sentenced to 30 Years,” International Herald Tribune.
Grad, “Reynolds Gets 30 Years in Terror Plot.”
“U.S. Man Sentenced to 30 Years,” International Herald Tribune.
 United States of America v. Mohammad Zaki Amawi, Marwan Othman El-Hindi, and Zand Wassim Mazloum , The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division, February 16, 2006, at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/indictment_22006.pdf(September 1,2011).
Grand jury indictment for United States v. Mohammed Zaki Amawi et al., January 19, 2007, at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/indictment_22006.pdf(May 10, 2011).
Mike Wilkinson and Christina Hall, “3 Charged in Terror Plot Local Suspects Planned Attacks in Iraq, U.S. Says,” ToledoBlade, February 22, 2006.
Press release, “Three Sentenced for Conspiring to Commit Terrorist Acts Against Americans Overseas,” U.S. Department of Justice, October 22, 2009, at http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/US_v_Amawi_dojprsent.pdf(May 5, 2011).
“Trial Looms for U.S. Suspect in Alleged Jihad Plot,” Associated Press, May 31, 2009, at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,523578,00.html(May 5, 2011).
Bill Rankin, “Atlanta Terrorism Suspect Seeks to Represent Himself,” TheAtlanta Journal–Constitution, March 3, 2009, at http://www.ajc.com/services/content/metro/atlanta/stories/2009/03/03/terrorism_suspect.html(May 5, 2011).
Bill Rankin, “Ex-Tech Student Found Guilty on Terrorism Charge,” The Atlanta Journal–Constitution, June 10, 2009, at http://www.ajc.com/metro/content/metro/stories/2009/06/10/terrorism_trial_tech.html(May 5, 2011).
Press release, “Ehsanul Islam Sadequee Receives 17 Years in Prison Co-Defendant Syed Haris Ahmed Receives 13 Years,” U.S. Department of Justice, December 14, 2009, at http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/US_v_HarisAhmed_dojprsentencing.pdf(May 5, 2011).
“Indictment: Suspects Wanted to ‘Kill All the Devils We Can,’” CNN, June 24, 2006, at http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/06/23/miami.raids/index.html(May 5, 2011).
Peter Whoriskey, “Man Acquitted in Terror Case Faces Deportation,” TheWashington Post, March 2, 2008, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/01/AR2008030101566.html(May 10, 2011).
Julienne Gage, “2nd Mistrial in ‘Liberty City 7’ Case,” TheWashington Post, April 17, 2008, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/16/AR2008041603607.html(May 5, 2011).
“Sears Tower Bomb Plot Leader Narseal Batiste Jailed,” BBC, November 20, 2009, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8371671.stm(May 5, 2011).
“FBI Busts ‘Real Deal’ Terror Plot Aimed at NYC–NJ Underground Transit Link,” Fox News, July 7, 2006, at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,202518,00.html(May 5, 2011).
Alison Gendar and Bill Hutchinson, “Assem Hammoud, Suspect in Alleged New York Tunnels Plot, Released on Bail in Lebanon,” New York Daily News, March 17, 2009, at http://www.nydailynews.com/news/us_world/2009/03/17/2009-03-17_assem_hammoud_suspect_in_alleged_new_yor.html(May 5, 2011).
Rachel Martin, “U.S. Uncovers ‘Advanced’ Bomb Plot U.S. Targeted,” NPR, August 10, 2006, at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5632570(May 5, 2011).
“3 Accused U.K. Airline ‘Liquid Bomb’ Plotters Found Guilty,” Associated Press, September 8, 2008, at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,418643,00.html(May 5, 2011).
Liza Porteus, “Feds Arrest Man They Say Planned to Detonate Grenades in Illinois Shopping Mall,” Fox News, December 9, 2006, at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,235518,00.html(May 5, 2011).
“35-Year Sentence for Mall Grenade Plotter,” CBS News, September 30, 2008, athttp://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/09/30/national/main4490504.shtml(May 5, 2011).
“Top 9/11 Suspects to Plead Guilty,” BBC, December 8, 2008, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7770856.stm(May 5, 2011).
Jason Ryan and Huma Khan, “In Reversal, Obama Orders Guantanamo Military Trial for 9/11 Mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,” ABC News, April 4, 2011, at http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/911-mastermind-khalid-sheikh-mohammed-military-commission/story?id=13291750(May 10, 2011).
Dale Russakoff and Dan Eggen, “Six Charged in Plot to Attack Fort Dix,” The Washington Post, May 9, 2007, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/08/AR2007050800465.html(May 5, 2011).
Press release, “Three Brothers Sentenced to Life Prison Terms for Conspiring to Kill U.S. Soldiers,” April 28, 2009, at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/April/09-nsd-401.html(May 5, 2011), and “Judge Sentences Two More in Ft. Dix Conspiracy,” Los Angeles Times, April 30, 2009, at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/30/nation/na-ftdix30(May 5, 2011).
Anthony Faiola and Steven Mufson, “N.Y. Airport Target of Plot, Officials Say,” The Washington Post, June 3, 2007, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/02/AR2007060200606.html(May 5, 2011).
 Ibid. “JFK Terror Plot Foiled in Planning Stages,” WNBC (New York), April 12, 2009 and “U.S.: ‘Unthinkable’ Terror Devastation Prevented,” Associated Press, June 3, 2007, at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18999503(May 5, 2011).
Press release, “Russell Defreitas Sentenced to Life in Prison for Conspiring to Commit Terrorist Attack at JFK Airport,” U.S. Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of New York, February 17, 2001, at http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2011/russell-defreitas-sentenced-to-life-in-prison-for-conspiring-to-commit-terrorist-attack-at-jfk-airport(May 5, 2011).Russell Defreitas Sentenced to Life in Prison for Conspiring to Commit Terrorist Attack at JFK Airport
Press release, “Imam from Trinidad Convicted of Conspiracy to Launch Terrorist Attack at JFK Airport: Defendant Plotted to Explode Fuel Tanks and Pipeline at Airport,” U.S. Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of New York, May 26, 2011, at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nye/pr/2011/2011may26b.html(September 2, 2011).
Lloyd de Vries, “Ex-Sailor Accused of Supporting Terrorism,” CBS News, March 8, 2007, at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/03/08/terror/main2546508.shtml(May 5, 2011), and Mark Spencer, “Hassan Abu-Jihaad, Former U.S. Sailor Who Leaked Navy Secrets Sentenced to Ten Years,” Hartford Courant, April 4, 2009.
“NY Appeals Court OKs Ex-Sailor’s Terror Conviction,” CBS New York, December 20, 2010, at http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2010/12/20/ny-appeals-court-oks-ex-sailors-terror-conviction(September 2, 2011).
Robert Wielaard, “Court: UK Must Delay Extraditing Britons to US,” Bloomberg Businessweek, July 8, 2010, at http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9GQSMO00.htm(May 5, 2011).
Press release, “Ohio Man Sentenced to 20 Years for Terrorism Conspiracy to Bomb Targets in Europe and the United States,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, February 26, 2009, at http://www.fbi.gov/cincinnati/press-releases/2009/ci022609.htm/(May 5, 2011).
Jonathan Dienst, “FBI, NYPD Arrest 4 in Alleged Plot to Bomb NY Synagogues,” NBC, May 21, 2009, at http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/FBI-Bust-Plot-Foiled.html(May 5, 2011).
Robert Gearty, “Judge Gives Men Convicted in Bronx Synagogue Bomb Plot 25 Years in Prison but Lambasts Government,” The Daily News, June 29, 2011, at http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-06-29/news/29737288_1_james-cromitie-bronx-synagogues-onta-williams(September 2, 2011).
Chris Dolmetsch and Patricia Hurtado, “Synagogue Bomb Plotters Sentenced to 25 Years in Prison,” Bloomberg Businessweek, June 29, 2011, at http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-06-29/synagogue-bomb-plotters-sentenced-to-25-years-in-prison.html(September 2, 2011).
 United States of America Against Najibullah Zazi, “Memorandum of Law in Support of the Government’s Motion for a Permanent Order of Detention,” United States District Court, Eastern District of New York, September 24, 2009, at http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/US_v_NajibullahZazi_detentionmemo.pdf(May 5, 2011).
Press release, “Charges Unsealed Against Five Alleged Members of Al-Qaeda Plot to Attack the United States and United Kingdom,” U.S. Department of Justice, July 7, 2010, at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/July/10-nsd-781.html(September 2, 2011).
“Additional Charged for Father in NYC Subway Plot,” CBS News, November 30, 2010, at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/11/30/national/main7103523.shtml(May 5, 2011).
“Cousin of Terrorist Admits Role in NYC Subway plot,” USA Today, July 19, 2011, at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2011-07-18-nyc-terror-plot_n.htm(September 2, 2011).
Adam Goldman and Tom Hays, “Police: NYC Terror Plotter Zazi Planned with at Least 2 Bombers to Kill Rush-Hour Commuters,” The Chicago Tribune, February 23, 2010.
William K. Rashbaum, “Uncle Who Vouched for Terror Suspect Arrested,” The New York Times, January 27, 2010, at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/28/nyregion/28zazi.html(May 6, 2011), and Amir Efrati, “Imam Pleads Guilty in New York Terror Case,” The Wall Street Journal, March 4, 2010, at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704187204575101981933707478.html?mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDDLTopStories(May 6, 2011).
Colleen Long, “Imam Booted Out of U.S.: ‘God Bless America,’” MSNBC, July 6, 2010, at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38101445/ns/us_news-security/(May 6, 2011).
“NYC Subway Terror Suspect Pleads Guilty,” Fox News, April 23, 2010, at http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/04/23/nyc-terror-suspect-plead-guilty(May 6, 2011), and William K. Rashbaum, “Queens Man Is Accused of Getting Qaeda Training,” The New York Times, January 9, 2010, at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/10/nyregion/10plot.html(May 6, 2011).
Adam Goldman and Matt Apuzzo, “U.S. Officials: Al-Qaida Agent Tied to N.Y. Plot,” MSNBC, June 30, 2010, at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38024998/(May 6, 2011).
Andrew Lebovich, “The LWOT: Sweden Looks for Accomplices in Suicide Bombing Abdulmutallab Hit with More Charges,” Foreign Policy, December 17, 2010, at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/12/17/the_lwot_sweden_looks_for_accomplices_in_suicide_bombing_abdulmutallab_hit_with_ (May 6, 2011).
“Jordanian Accused in Dallas Bomb Plot Goes to Court,” CNN, September 25, 2009, at http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/09/25/texas.terror.arrest/index.html(May 6, 2011).
Christopher Wills, “Michael Finton Pleads Guilty in Springfield Bomb Plot,” The Huffington Post, May 9, 2011, at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/10/michael-finton-pleads-gui_n_859922.html(September 2, 2011)
“Abby Goodnough and Liz Robbins, “Mass. Man Arrested in Terrorism Case,” TheNew York Times, October 21, 2009, at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/22/us/22terror.html(May 10, 2011).
Denise Lavoie, “Boston Terror Arrest: Tarek Mehanna Arrested for Planning Attacks on Shopping Malls,” The Huffington Post, October 21, 2009, at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/10/21/boston-terror-arrest-sudb_n_328428.html(May 6, 2011).
Denise Lavoie, “Accused Terror Suspect Pleads Not Guilty: Man is Accused of Conspiring to Help al-Qaeda,” MSNBC, July 20, 2010, at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38333130/ns/us_news-security/(May 6, 2011).
“Christmas Day ‘Bomber’ Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab Charged,” The Sunday Times, January 7, 2010, at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article6978736.ece(May 10, 2011).
Press release, “Chicago Man Charged with Providing Material Support to al Qaeda by Attempting to Send Funds Overseas,” U.S. Attorney, Northern District of Illinois, March 26, 2010, at http://www.justice.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2010/pr0326_01.pdf(May 6, 2011).
Press release, “Fact Sheet on Security Enhancements: Statement by John Brennan on Holiday Security,” StatesmanJournal.com, December 22, 2010, at http://community.statesmanjournal.com/blogs/editorialblog/2010/12/22/increased-security-for-the-holidays/(May 6, 2011).
Press release, “Chicago Man Charged with Providing Material Support to al Qaeda by Attempting to Send Funds Overseas.”
Press release, “Faisal Shahzad Indicted for Attempted Car Bombing in Times Square,” U.S. Department of Justice, June 17, 2010, at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/June/10-ag-713.html(May 6, 2011).
Jerry Markon, “Long Term for Failed Times Square Bomber,” The Washington Post, October 6, 2010, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/05/AR2010100505683.html(May 6, 2011).
“Alaska Man Pleads Guilty to Making False Statements in Domestic Terrorism Investigation,” U.S. Department of Justice, July 21, 2010, at http://www.justice.gov/usao/ak/press/2010/July/Rockwood_Paul_Nadia_07-21-10.pdf(May 6, 2011), and Carolyn Kuckertz, “Alaskan Builds Terror Hit List Pleads Guilty,” KTVA, July 21, 2010.
Press release, “Virginia Man Arrested for Plotting Attacks on D.C.-area Metro Stations with People He Believed to Be Al-Qaeda Members,” U.S. Department of Justice, October 27, 2010, at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/October/10-nsd-1213.html(May 6, 2011).
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, “Affidavit in Support of Application for Search Warrant,” October 26, 2010, at http://www.scribd.com/doc/40331428/Farooque-Ahmed-Search-Warrant-Affidavit(May 6, 2011).
Carol Cratty and Jim Barnett, “Guilty Plea Entered in Thwarted Metro Station Bomb Plot,” CNN, April 11, 2011, at http://articles.cnn.com/2011-04-11/justice/virginia.bomb.plot_1_farooque-ahmed-metro-stations-qaeda?_s=PM:CRIME(September 2, 2011).
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Jayshree Bajoria, “The Debate Over Airport Security,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 28, 2010, at http://www.cfr.org/publication/23673/debate_over_airport_security.html(May 6, 2011), and Mark Mazetti, Robert F. Worth, and Eric Lipton, “Bomb Plot Shows Key Role Played in Intelligence,” The New York Times, October 31, 2010, at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/01/world/01terror.html(May 6, 2011).
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Dan Cook, “Somali-Born Teen Pleads Not Guilty in U.S. Bomb Case,” Reuters, November 30, 2010, at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6AS5PU20101130(May 6, 2011).
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“U.S. Man Pleads Not Guilty in Maryland Car Bomb Plot,” Reuters, January 8, 2011, at http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/01/07/idINIndia-54012820110107(May 6, 2011).
Betsy Blaney, “Saudi Man Pleads Not Guilty to Bomb Plot in Texas,” MSNBC, March 28, 2011, at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42308507/ns/us_news-security/(September 2, 2011).
Roco Parascandola, Alison Gendar, and Bill Hutchinson, “NYPD Arrests Two Queens Terror Suspects, Charged with Plot to Hit NYC Synagogues with Grenades,” NY Daily News, May 13, 2011, at http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/2011/05/12/2011-05-12_nypd_arrests_two_queens_terror_suspects_charged_with_plot_to_hit_nyc_synagogues_.html(May 16, 2011).
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Parascandola et al., “NYPD Arrests Two Queens Terror Suspects, Charged with Plot to Hit NYC Synagogues with Grenades.”